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TRANSATLANTIC CHARTER POLICY-
A STUDY IN AIRLINE REGULATION
By JACK M. GOLDKLANGt
I. INTRODUCTION
A NYONE with enough money can charter a bus, a train, or an ocean
liner with few questions asked. Chartering an airplane stands in a
class by itself. It can involve compliance with a very complex collection
of government and private restrictions.
In recent years the charter aviation field has grown tremendously. Since
1957 charter traffic over the Atlantic has increased at the rate of fifty
percent each year so that at the height of the 1960 season eleven percent
of all transatlantic air traffic was carried on charter flights.' The reason
for this increase is not difficult to understand. A round trip charter to
Paris may save the chartering party fifty percent of the regular fare.'
Not everyone is eligible for this great savings, however. As a result, part
of the traveling public is able to obtain a transportation bargain while
the majority must cope with expensive single-ticket fares.
How this situation evolved is not a simple story. It provides an inter-
esting example of the meeting between private industry and government
regulation. This article will attempt to tell that story, explain the charter
rules today, and explore the future for this field. It will focus on the
development of the transatlantic civilian passenger charter market, dealing
with the ordinary case where a group hires a plane on a pro-rata share
basis.' The first part of the article concentrates on placing charter de-
velopment in an industry-wide setting. Many of the legal and admin-
istrative problems alluded to in this section are discussed in greater detail
in the second part. It is hoped that this organization will make the history
more readable and the law more comprehensible.
II. HISTORY OF CHARTER REGULATION
A. Early Developments; 1945-1954
The history of the Civil Aeronautics Board's policy in the trans-
atlantic charter field is very complex. This complexity stems from the
dynamic changes which have shaped the course of aviation history since
the Second World War.
At the end of World War II a large number of surplus airplanes became
available at low prices. The scheduled airlines were faced with growing
t Cornell University, A.B., 1958; Harvard University, LL.B., 1961.
'Transatlantic Charter Trips, Proposed Rule, 25 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
'The economy class rate round trip New York to Paris is $525.60. Since complete domination of
the scheduled airlines by jet transportation is at hand, the jet fare is given. Hudson, Take-over by
jets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1961, § 10, pt. 1, p. 3, col. 7. Charter fares by piston plane or turbo-
prop cost about $260.
3 This is meant to exclude the cargo issue and also "single-entity" charters where the entire
price is paid by one party. See CAB Econ. Regs. Pt. 295, Subpt. B (1960).
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pains and it became relatively easy for non-scheduled airlines with small
amounts of capital to enter the arena.' These "non-skeds" were authorized
to provide only "irregular, limited, and sporadic service." This included
the right to carry passengers in foreign air transportation.' In theory these
new carriers were not supposed to be in direct competition with certifi-
cated service. Nevertheless, the Board's rules were not strictly followed
and competition with the scheduled lines did exist. After September 10,
1947 the irregular carriers were no longer permitted to engage in foreign
air transportation. The Board announced that, in view of the expansion
of the American certificated airlines and the award of permits to foreign
air carriers, continued activity by the irregular carriers in the foreign
field was no longer justified.6 The scheduled American carriers and foreign
flag lines had authority to carry charter trips as well as individually
ticketed passengers.7 However, they were chiefly occupied at this time
with developing scheduled service on their regular routes.
The Board's action did not successfully halt all of the activity of the
irregular carriers in the foreign field. There was resistance to the new
restrictions. For example, on January 6, 1948 the CAB charged Trans-
ocean Airlines, an irregular carrier, with violation of the ban on foreign
transportation of passengers.! Transocean and other carriers in a similar
position argued that since they were operating charter flights they were
not engaged in common carriage and therefore were not subject to the
Board's jurisdiction.9 Despite the order, in the summer of 1948 Trans-
ocean carried eight round trip student charters to Europe." The CAB
staff was forced to spend a lot of time establishing the necessary jurisdic-
tional facts in the cases of Transocean and other irregular carriers. 1 On
June 5, 1950 the Board held that Transocean had been violating the
Aviation Act by engaging in its transatlantic charter activities. It said
that even if all of Transocean's flights were limited to planeload lots,
carrying bona fide charter groups, it would still be engaged in common
carriage. Because the airline indiscriminately carried all charter groups
it could not be a private carrier for hire. 2
In the meantime other developments had made it possible for the non-
certificated carriers to engage in foreign transportation on a limited basis
without defying the Board's orders. In May 1949 the Board indicated that
it would grant a limited number of exemptions to irregular carriers to
'Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838, Initial decision of the Trial Ex-
aminer at 891 (1955).
sIbid; CAB Econ. Regs., § 292.1, 14 C.F.R. § 291 (1949).
6 Ibid; CAB Econ. Regs. § 291.23, as amended June 10, 1947, Transocean A.L., Enforcement
Proceeding, 11 C.A.B. 350, 358 (1950); American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Comments on Re-
examination of Exemption Policy and Proposed Transatlantic Air Policy for 1951, Nov. 22, 1950
(mim).
The Civil Aeronautics Act § 401, 52 Star. 987, 49 U.S.C. 481, provided that U.S. certificated
carriers "may conduct charter trips without regard to the points named in its certificate, under
regulations prescribed by the Board."
Foreign carriers were given authority in their permits to engage in air transportation, which
included charters, between points named in their certificates. Foreign Off-Route Charter Service
Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 2.
'Order No. E-1105.
9Section 401 of the present Act prohibits a carrier from engaging in "air transportation" without
a certificate. Sections 101 (10) and 101 (21) limit the certification requirement to situations where
the airline acts as a common carrier; Investigation of Seaboard & Western Airlines, Inc., 11 C.A.B.
372, 378 (1950).
50 Transocean A.L., Enforcement Proceeding, 11 C.A.B. 3 50 (1950).
"1949 Ann. Rep. of the CAB 19.
is Transocean A.L., Enforcement Proceeding, 11 C.A.B. 350 (1950).
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conduct transatlantic charter flights." Special exemptions were given to
two irregular carriers permitting them to operate five round trips carry-
ing students to Rome and Tel Aviv. 4 In support of the exemptions the
Board mentioned that there would be little effect on the certificated carriers
since their facilities were inadequate to handle the transatlantic traffic
available at the height of the tourist season. The Board indicated that it
would consider requests for exemptions as long as they were for charter
trips by "recognized educational, religious and charitable groups." It
turned down a request by Flying Tiger Line for a blanket exemption
to fly charters and pointed out that it did not plan to make any general
change in the restrictions it had placed on the non-certificated carriers."
Other irregular and cargo carriers took advantage of the Board's an-
nouncement and a number of additional exemptions were issued for the
summer of 1949. One of the carriers was Transocean which got permis-
sion to conduct 44 transatlantic flights. The carrier was very careful to
stipulate that by accepting the exemptions it was not conceding its dis-
pute then pending with the Board over the latter's jurisdiction."6 Another
carrier got permission for seventy one-way charter flights under similar
circumstances. 7
In all, it has been estimated that 2,500 students flew to Europe at
bargain charter rates during the summer of 1949 at an average of $350
per round trip. " At that time the only available service on scheduled
air lines was first class. The cost of a round trip from New York to
London was $630.1"
The Board advised the scheduled American carriers that it not only
opposed introducing a less expensive form of scheduled transportation
than the prevailing first class service but that it would favor an increase
of seven per cent, raising the New York to London one-way fare, for
example, from $350 to $375." This advice was based on the theory
that it was not possible to have enough difference in service to distinguish
between first class and other service. It was thought that the resulting
diversion from first class would ultimately come out of the taxpayer's
pocket in the form of additional subsidy for the scheduled carriers."
Despite these developments the Board decided to continue its charter
exemption experiment. In December 1949 it undertook to describe in more
detail just what its policy would be. At this point basic differences among
Board members on the problems of low cost travel came into the open."
The announcement of December 1949 invited carriers without trans-
"CAB Press Release 49-36, May 13, 1949.
14 Orders E-2817, E-2818, May 14, 1949.
"CAB Press Release 49-36, May 13, 1949.
16 Order E-2905, June 3, 1949.
' Seaboard & Western Airlines, Order No. E-2906, June 3, 1949.
18 American Soc'y of Travel Agents (ASTA), Comments on Re-examination of Exemption Policy
25, Nov. 22, 1950 (mim).
" "Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries," Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary, H. of R., 84th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 1, Airlines, at 1032 (1956).
20 As matters developed the rate conference of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) did not approve the general increase and it did not go into effect. Policy Statement on
Transatlantic Air Travel for 1950, issued with CAB Press Release 49-99, Dec. 6, 1949.
" Letter from CAB to Presidents of U.S. Int'l Carriers November 3, 1949, released with CAB
Press Release 49-99, Dec. 6, 1949; Letter from CAB to Presidents of U.S. International Carriers,
April 27, 1949.
" CAB Press Release 49-99, Dec. 6, 1949, issued with Policy Statement on Transatlantic Air
Travel for 1950.
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atlantic routes to seek permission to carry charter groups during the 1950
tourist season. The Board expressed confidence that the scheduled carriers
could handle off-season traffic without help. Since the certificated lines
were being subsidized, the Board made it clear that if they were to con-
duct charter flights on their own routes the Board would not allow
diversions from more expensive service to increase subsidies.
The Board's policy had the marks of improvisation. Some members
felt that exceptional circumstances existed and that it was therefore best
not to commit any solution to a permanent set of regulations. The CAB
noted that abnormal travel pressures had built up because of war time
restrictions, the coming of Catholic Holy Year and devaluations of
foreign currency. The public interest aspects of granting the exemptions
were stressed. It was said that foreign policy would be aided by contacts
between American tourists and Europeans and by the dollar flow that
tourism would generate. 3 Furthermore, the Department of State, the
Department of Commerce and the Economic Cooperation Administration
stressed the importance of travel in helping international understanding. 4
The standard for exemptions, as announced, was both vague and
restrictive. Chartering groups were limited, as in the previous year, to
bona fide religious, educational and charitable groups. The trip had to
be "in furtherance of a common objective" and this objective had to be
clear cut.2" Applications had to be submitted well before the summer
season and firm contracts must have been made with the carriers at the
time of application."
In a strong minority comment Member Harold A. Jones challenged
the economy, legality and public interest of the new policy. If the Board
had thought that a special low fare was in the public interest in 1950,
he argued, it should have faced the issue directly and supported a low
fare by the scheduled airlines. If the diversion argument was correct,
then the charter policy must be uneconomical. Off-season excursion rates
which had been encouraged were not going to be used when people might
travel even more cheaply during the height of the season. The vague
standards which were adopted risked opening the floodgates. At the same
time those carriers not eligible would not be getting equal treatment from
the government. Exemptions, he said, should not be used to get around
the principle of route security intended by Congress."
Administrative difficulties soon materialized. The exemptions which had
been issued during 1949 led people to think that an easier situation would
exist in 1950. Travel agents and organizations advertized charter flights
before seeking permission for such flights. Business was solicited from
individuals, especiallly in the student and teacher market, even though
the policy statement indicated that the Board planned to grant exemptions
only to bona fide groups."
In May 1950 special exemptions were given to three carriers, making
it possible for them to carry a total of eighty flights. The orders emphasized
23 Ibid.
24 CAB Statement of action on applications for permission to carry groups on special transatlan-
tic charter trips, May 20, 1950; issued with CAB Press Release 50-28.
21 CAB Press Release, supra note 22.
26 CAB Statement, supra note 24.
" CAB Press Release, supra note 22.
28 CAB Policy Statement, supra note 22.
"' CAB Press Release 50-28, May 20, 1950.
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safety records and previous experience with four engine aircraft in trans-
atlantic operations as the important factors in selection. The carriers re-
ceiving exemptions were Flying Tiger, Seaboard & Western and Trans-
ocean Airlines."0 There were seven orders denying exemptions. Most of
them mentioned the fact that the burden of proof had not been met
as to the bona fides of the group applying for charter, but it appeared
at the same time that safety was the Board's primary concern."
The Board announced that groups contracting with airlines which had
been denied exemptions would now be able to make arrangements with
those which had received approval,3" A representative of one of the carriers
which was denied an exemption said that his company paid the fares of
eight hundred students at a loss so that they could travel to Montreal and
then cross the Atlantic on a Canadian airline."3
Member Jones who had originally objected to the Board's policy did
not participate in the May decisions. On this occasion a strong minority
statement was issued by Member Josh Lee. He objected to granting
exemptions to carriers which had long violation records and which even
then were the subjects of enforcement proceedings."4 In the case of Trans-
ocean, for example, the very experience which was made the basis of the
exemptions had been gained in defiance of the Board's orders. The Board,
caught between policies of wanting maximum experience and not wanting
to reward those who had flaunted its jurisdiction, decided in favor of
experience.
Lee recognized the difficult problem which confronted the Board in
determining what constituted a bona fide charter group. He was in favor
of doing away with this standard altogether and limiting charter flights
to those groups which had purchased package tours including all the
necessary arrangements. This, he argued, would simplify administration
and still protect the certificated carriers by allowing them to carry these
groups."3
Another important problem confronting the Board was the regulation
of indirect carriers in the charter field. These organizations contracted
with the carriers for the operation of flights, issued their own tickets and
assigned people to flights without any responsibility on the carrier's part.
Because the certification requirement refers to anyone who engages either
"directly or indirectly" in air transportation it was necessary for these
groups to receive exemptions of their own."6 The bona fide group concept
was supposed to apply to groups that reserved seats through the indirect
carriers; but it appears that the standard broke down completely in
cases in which these carriers were involved. An indirect carrier called
Youth Argosy, which had been active in previous summers, asked for
permission to operate eighty flights. After hearing the details the Board
decided that forty flights would be enough to carry the groups which
met the Board's standards." Special permission was given, however, to
fill these planes with individuals if there were any space remaining.
"sOrders E-4190, E-4191, E-4192, E-4201, May 19, 1950.
31 Orders E-4193 through E-4200, May 19, 1950.
32 CAB Statement, supra note 24.
3 ASTA Comments, supra note 18, at 30.
34 CAB Statement, supra note 24.
3a CAB Statement, supra note 24.
S' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 (3).
"
7 Order No. E-4190, May 19, 1950.
as CAB Press Release 50-28, May 20, 1950.
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Under the exemptions granted in 1950 more than half of the 2,633
passengers which Youth Argosy carried were individuals. Furthermore a
list of the "groups" which were carried shows that the announced standards
were all but ignored. Ten of the groups listed had only one member."
Most of them had less than ten members and many of these did not travel
as a group on the same flight." Some of the "group" names were merely
names of travel agencies.4' The organization's solicitation material made
no reference to the group requirement although it did state that those
participating in the flights should have "educational, religious, or chari-
table motivation." 2 The difficulties involved in this sort of test are self-
evident.
Five years later a member of the Board was to refer to the summer of
1950 as "a period of unfortunate experience. '"" A description of events
as they occurred certainly bears this out.
The activities by indirect carriers created situations in which passengers
were left stranded, sometimes in cases of real hardship. One agency left
one hundred eighty tourists in Paris saying that there simply was not
enough money left to pay for return flights.4 Eventually these passengers
had to sign a note for 165 dollars payable to the airline, but collectable
only if the travel service defaulted completely.45 A student group ran
out of money and slept on the floor of the student travel agency in Paris
until informed that the agency had gone broke. In Luxembourg, when
planes were delayed, an appeal was sent out through the newspapers asking
people to take members of Youth Argosy into their homes. Perle Mesta,
the United States Minister in Luxembourg opened a free lunch counter
for 300 stranded students at the U.S. legation." Responsibility seemed to
lie with the defaulting travel services rather than with the airlines. Inci-
dents like these gave rise to the later adoption of provisions requiring the
chartering group to post bonds or advance payment and eliminating in-
direct carriers from the charter field.
Under the 1950 program exemptions had been allowed for a total of
105 round trip flights between the United States and Europe. Three
irregular carriers and one domestic certified carrier were ultimately in-
volved in these operations."s About 5,000 students were carried on these
flights at prices well below first class fares.
As a result of its 1950 experience the Board instituted a Re-examination
of Exemption Policy consisting of informal conferences and presentation
of evidence beginning late in September 1950."' The facts developed above
were brought out at these conferences. It was suggested that the Board
must either "open the door" or be prepared to deal with all manner of
subterfuge and special "deals."' It was also argued that circumstances
'9 ASTA Comments, supra note 18, append. 1.4 0 Id. at 12.
" ASTA Comments, supra note 18, append. 1.
42 Letter from Monroe Smith, President, Youth Argosy to potential members, Oct. 5, 1950, in-
cluded in ASTA Comments, supra note 18, append. 3.
"a 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, 20 C.A.B. 782, 786 (1955).
" ASTA Comments, supra note 18, at 6.
41 Id. at 7.
4' Ibid.
4 ASTA Comments, supra note 18, at 9.
48 1950 Ann. Rep. of the CAB 25.
"' ASTA Comments, supra note 18, at 1, 9.
0Id. at 31.
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in transatlantic air travel had changed sufficiently so that it would then
be practical to have two distinct classes of service. The scheduled airlines
had begun to advertise luxurious meals, free wines and liquors, and more
comfortable seating arrangements. Domestic coach service had been in
existence since September 1949. It seemed that there might now be room
for two distinct classes of international service, eliminating the charter
problem. Slower planes such as the DC-4 with closer seating arrangements
might be used for a tourist class as newer aircraft were coming into use.5
Part of the Board's plan was to regulate charter conditions for certifi-
cated carriers." Pan American Airlines requested that the Board permit
relative freedom with regard to charters by the certificated airlines, saying
that the protection given by certificate was not meant to apply to charter
competition by other certificated carriers. It was suggsted that travel
bureaus be permitted to organize groups for charters."
The Board still had relatively limited knowledge of the problems in-
volved in charter activity. Many ideas were suggested by the rules which
the airlines had adopted privately through resolutions of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA)."
IATA, representing the scheduled airlines had been wrestling with the
charter problem for a number of years. In June 1947 there was a proposal
to admit charter operators to IATA if they were of sound financial stand-
ing." Charter competition had made IATA consider introducing a more
austere type of service as early as 1948." However, the members of the
organization decided not to admit charter operators and to guard against
chartering as a medium of price cutting within their own organization.
IATA recommended that members stop servicing and other operational
agreements with non-scheduled airlines. A campaign was started, asking
governments to crack down on the international operations of the non-
skeds." IATA also moved to curb the practice of chartering planes to
travel agents who proceeded to retail seats on a basis which under cut the
fare schedule that IATA works to maintain."
An IATA proposal of December 1948 recommended that charter con-
tracts stipulate that space would not be resold at less than IATA fares.
Exceptions were made only for government organizations that were
aiding immigrants and displaced persons." This original charter resolu-
tion soon proved inadequate." IATA carriers were prevented from meet-
ing outside competition." Before the CAB issued its new regulation in
May 1951 the IATA legal committee had been working with a "common
interest" test for charter groups." It was very difficult to draft a resolu-
tion without loopholes that would cover all the cases of "common inter-
51 Id. at 27, 28.
"Draft release No. 42, Docket DR-42.
"ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 803 (195 5).
"Letter from Chief of CAB Office of Information, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1959, § 2, p. 21, col. 2.
55 5 IATA Bull. 12 (June 1947).
58 IATA Bull. 26 (Dec. 1948).
"Id. at 69.
518 IATA Bull. 69 (Dec. 1948); see also Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra
note 19, at 1123.
598 IATA Bull. 69 (Dec. 1948).
"I d. at 70.
"' 14 IATA Bull. 83 (Dec. 1951).
2 21 IATA Bull. 95 (1955).
314 IATA Bull. 68 (Dec. 1951).
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est" which might justify a group charter. There was the danger that a
narrowly drafted resolution might require members to determine the state
of mind of the chartering group and become more of a hindrance than a
help in future business."'
On March 22, 1951 the CAB severely limited the authority of the
non-skeds in the domestic airline industry." Two weeks later a new
Board policy statement spelled their end in the international field." At
the same time a regulation was issued defining charter rules for certifi-
cated American carriers."
The Board examined the results of the 1950 season and concluded that
all of the passengers handled by the supplemental carriers could have been
carried by the certificated lines with only a slight revision in schedules.
Therefore no further charter exemptions were to be granted unless there
was an affirmative showing that the authorized carriers were unable to
provide "reasonably adequate service."0
The standard of "reasonably adequate service" was to be judged by
charter rates established by the scheduled airlines." The Board requested
that IATA adopt a resolution fixing minimum rates for charter flights
above what had been the free market rate." This was not done and charter
prices remained uncontrolled.
The scheduled airlines were told to make arrangements to rent extra
airplanes for the peak season so that it would not be necessary for others
to share in the transatlantic market." In accordance with this policy, Pan
American, for example, rented planes from National Airlines which had
a seasonal decline during the summer.' The Board said that it would not
grant further exemptions to indirect carriers. However, it would encourage
low fares for individuals on regular transatlantic flights. 3 In the spring of
1951 the Board asked that a tourist service be started on the North
Atlantic routes in time for the 1952 season. An agreement was reached
which set fares at substantially those recommended by the Board." Mean-
while the IATA-regulated round trip fare from New York to London
reached $675 in 1951. It had been $630 in 1949."
The new policy effectively cut the irregular carriers out of the com-
mercial charter market. As a rule exemptions were given only to carry
military personnel and refugee groups across the Atlantic." The new
domestic and international restrictions left only the military situation to
keep the irregular carriers alive." An investigation was launched which
64 Ibid.
60CAB Econ. Regs. § 291.27, 16 Fed. Reg. 2216 (1951).
6CAB Press Release 51-28, March 22, issued with CAB Policy Statement on Transatlantic
Charters, March 16, 1951, 2 Av. L. Rep. para. 23110 (1951).
6714 C.F.R. § 207 (1951).
68 CAB Policy Statement, supra note 66.
69 Ibid.
'o American Aviation, March 19, 1951, p. 2.
"1 CAB Policy Statement, supra note 66.
"ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 800 (1955).
,' CAB Policy Statement, supra note 66.
74 1951 CAB Ann. Rep. 35.
"Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra note 19, at 1032.
76 See, e.g., CAB Weekly Summary of Orders and Regulations Nos. 272-300 (1951).
7Henzey, Defense Role for Non-skeds under New CAB Policy, American Aviation, March 19,
1951, p. 41.
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was ultimately to determine the place of the irregular carriers in the
aviation industry."
During the first summer of the new policy the Board retreated slightly.
Youth Argosy received permission to arrange thirteen flights for those
who had relied on the old policy. It was permitted to fill these flights with
later applicants, if necessary. The Board stressed the fact that this was
done out of consideration for the passengers and not for Youth Argosy."
The Flying Tiger Line was given an exemption to conduct operations for
Argosy"0 and also received exemptions for several other student trips."
This, however, was all the transatlantic charter activity permitted the
non-skeds during the summer of 1951.
Meanwhile the total number of charter passengers carried across the
Atlantic by scheduled IATA carriers doubled. Nearly 12,000 charter pas-
sengers were carried in 1951 compared to 5,600 in 1950."
An attempt was made to break the barrier of the 1951 Policy Statement
by finding a loophole in the Civil Aviation Act. Flying Tiger, a certifi-
cated cargo carrier, argued that the provision that charter trips might be
made "without regard to the points named in its certificate" gave it the
right to conduct passenger charters if it wanted to do so. The Board held
that the words "charter trips" refer to the conditions under which the
carriage is performed and not to the type of traffic which is carried. Since
Flying Tiger was a cargo carrier, it was limited to carrying cargo charters
under its certificate. It could not use this argument to re-enter the market
closed by the Board's policy statement."
From 1951 to 1955, the new Part 207 of the CAB Economic Regula-
tions provided the framework for charter activities. It was meant to limit
charter flights so that they could not be used as a device to undermine
regular fares and eventually cost the American public more money in
subsidy." In taking steps to regulate U.S. carriers the CAB suggested that
if foreign carriers were not similarly limited the CAB would re-examine
its own policy." After all, the CAB had ended "wasteful competitive
practices.""' Now it was expected that foreign carriers would tighten up
their own regulations. The CAB had the potential power to regulate
directly the foreign charters entering the United States; however, it was
not until 1958 that the Board was to issue a regulation in this field."
The provisions of Part 207 were comparatively simple. The new regula-
tion focused on limiting methods by which charter groups could be
solicited. The activities of travel agents were severely curtailed. No charter
flight could be organized by a person whose business was the sale of
transportation services." The profit was thereby taken out of organizing
charters. No arrangement was valid where the total amount paid by the
78 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, Docket No. 5132.
7 8 Order No. E-5359, March 23, 1951; Order No. E-5390.
8" Order No. E-5420.
"University of Cal., Order No. E-5435; World Assembly of Youth, Order No. E-5627.
" IATA World Air Transport Statistics 40 (1960).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (e); Charter Flight Tariff Investigation, 15 C.A.B. 921
(1952).
8414 C.F.R. § 207 (1951).
"CAB Press Release 21-58, March 22, 1951.
"
8 Preface, 14 C.F.R. § 207 (1951).
' See text, infra p. -.
8814 C.F.R. S 207.1(a) (2) (1951).
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passengers was more than the carrier's published rate. 9 There was to be
no soliciting of individuals from the general public." The point at which
a solicited group was deemed to be equal to the general public was a
difficult decision to make under the regulation.
By regulating the solicitation process rather than describing the nature
of eligible charter groups the Board evidently hoped to avoid the possibility
of unjust discrimination in the rules."'
After the 1949-50 period, when it had used the "religious, educational,
and charitable" test, the Board decided the Free and Reduced Rate Trans-
portation Case."' It held that a reduced rate must be available to all who
apply and must not be related to the "mission, business, or status" of the
passenger. A tariff based on "community of interest and purpose" of the
traveling group was held to be unjustly discriminatory.
This decision has not prevented the Board from looking at the "pur-
pose and objectives" of the group as evidence of whether there has been
actual solicitation of the public. 3 It has meant that a previously un-
affiliated group, able to meet the Board's standards, has occasionally been
permitted to charter an airplane. 4 However, the importance of the rule
allowing "spontaneous" charters has been largely academic. In one case,
a scheduled TWA flight had mechanical trouble just before take-off and
the passengers were able to charter an airplane from a competitor at a
lower rate." By barring the activities of agents and promoters the Board
has left very little opportunity for forming charter groups unless the
group has had a "prior affinity.""
There was no limit to the number of charters that a scheduled carrier
might conduct as long as they were flown on its certificated route." Except
for filing a tariff no prior authorization was necessary."
Off-route charters were limited by a formula based on the previous
year's scheduled mileage." In practice the scheduled carriers fly such a
large number of scheduled miles that this limit has never restricted their
activities in this area."' Before conducting an off-route charter flight it
was necessary to get permission from the other carriers serving that route
or to go to the Board for a finding of public interest.! The other carriers
might contest this finding, showing that they were equipped to handle
the traffic themselves.! Part 207 still exists in its original form.'
The Board was content to let regulation of foreign carriers remain the
primary responsibility of IATA whose members were bound by Charter
8914 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (4) (1951).
9" Ibid.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. 1374; Foreign Off-route
Charter Service Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958, Examiner's Recommended Decision
16.
214 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
"Pan American World Airways, Re Rate and Traffic Matters, 18 C.A.B. 648 (1954).
9414 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (3) (1951).
"5Examiner's Recommended Decision, supra note 91, at 15 n. 26.
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Resolution 045. It held, however, that the two U.S. transatlantic carriers,
TWA and Pan American, remained bound by the terms of Part 207, con-
ditioning its approval of Resolution 045 to that effect.4 Basically the IATA
resolution then in effect resembled Part 207. However, the Board wanted
IATA to abandon its strict "prior affinity" test because of the discrimina-
tion issue mentioned before. For a number of years IATA did not comply
with this request.'
In 1952 the Board issued a policy statement reaffirming the previous
year's stand and mentioning the fact that the new transatlantic tourist
fares would minimize any need for special charter relief." The new fares
went into effect in May 1952 and soon proved popular. The tourist fare
for a round trip from New York to London was $486; first class
service had risen to $711. The number of charter passengers carried
by the scheduled lines continued to grow. In 1952 IATA members carried
15,684 charter passengers across the North Atlantic. The following year,
when tourist fares were fully implemented, scheduled totals in tourist class
rose from 188,701 in 1952 to 320,529; however, the number of charter
passengers remained about the same as in 1952.8 In 1954 charter totals
had risen to 30,858 while all scheduled North Atlantic passengers totaled
550,000.9 There was an indication that at the peak of the summer season
none of the Atlantic carriers were able to satisfy the demand for any type
of accommodation including charters. The non-skeds had ceased, of
course, to be important in the transatlantic commercial charter field. No
decision had yet been announced in the Large Irregular Air Carrier In-
vestigation which had started in 1951.
B. The Charter Market Grows, 195 5-1962
In May 1955 the Board made an important change in charter policy.
After hearing oral argument, it announced a plan to grant exemptions to
supplemental and cargo carriers." It carefully limited the announcement
to the summer of 1955, saying that continuation of the policy depended
on the disposition of the Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation." The
new policy made it possible for the non-skeds to compete once again in
the transatlantic market. Where the passengers shared costs on a pro-rata
basis, the scheduled carriers still had a right of first refusal on their own
routes. However, the Board was now willing to consider rate differences
in deciding whether to grant an exemption to an irregular carrier. The
general definitions adopted in Part 207 were applied to the irregular car-
riers. The "essential to the success of the movement" test was abandoned.
A number of points not explained in Part 207 were made more explicit.
Agents were permitted to represent the airlines as long as their commission
did not exceed five percent." It was thought that by keeping commissions
low there would be little incentive for agents to form bogus charter groups.
It was still not clear, however, whether an agent could represent a bona
' Pan American, supra note 93, at 650; See text, infra page -
'Order No. E-12228, March 7, 1958.
62 Av. L. Rep. para. 23133 (1952).
'Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra note 19, at 1032.
' IATA, World Air Transport Statistics 40, 41 (1960).
9 id. at 41.
1ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 800 (1955).
"The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, 20 C.A.B. 782 (1955).
"Docket No. 5132.
'" The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy, 20 C.A.B. 782 (1955).
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fide group if no individual solicitation had taken place."' Advertising by
the carriers was severely limited. Any advertising of individual pro-rated
charter shares was to be considered solicitation of individuals and would
be grounds for denying an exemption. To preserve the distinction between
individual fares and charter service, a group that chartered more than
one round-trip flight was not allowed to mingle passengers from different
flights on return trips."1
A number of procedural innovations were made in 1955. To avoid
stranding incidents, carriers were instructed to require full payment or
bond ahead of time. An informal method of conference with the director
of the Bureau of Air Operations was devised so that groups would not
go through the exemption procedure and learn at the last minute that
they were ineligible from the start. A list of expenses incurred in organizing
the charter had to be given to the passengers so that there would be no
hidden profit. The total amount of expenses incurred in organizing the
charter was considered in granting the exemption."6
A dissent from the Policy was issued by Member Chan Guerney. He
cited the unfortunate experiences that had resulted from the pre-1951
approach and expressed the opinion that legitimate charters could still
be handled by the scheduled carriers.
However, the scheduled carriers' own testimony showed that there was
not a carrier on the Atlantic that could satisfy the demand at the peak
of the season, including the demand for charter service.' Nonetheless, they
fought the further entry of the irregular carriers in the foreign field. Pan
American warned that more American competition would hurt foreign
relations." Pan American was still heavily subsidized and TWA only
recently had stopped receiving help." In the year ending March 31, 1955
federal subsidy to all the international carriers amounted to $25,210,000."0
The financial success of the scheduled airlines in the charter business was
still uncertain. After several years of active participation in the field, Pan
American had made no study to see if its charter operations were profitable
on an allocated cost basis or otherwise." It is doubtful, therefore, whether
the Board could have made good its threat of December 1949 to disallow
diversion losses incurred by the scheduled carriers own charter operations
in computing subsidy.
With the institution of a more liberal policy for irregular carriers, the
Board ordered an investigation into problems connected with activities
of foreign carriers in the charter field." There was to be no decision re-
sulting from this new inquiry for three years."
The decision in the Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation was an-
nounced later in the year.' It was directed toward a policy of survival
14 Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation, Order No. E-12945, September 8, 1958,
Examiner's Recommended Decision, p. 13.
1 1955 Policy, supra note 13.
"0 Ibid.
'7 ACTA-IMATA Commercial 'Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 800 (1955).
1" Ibid.
"ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 803 (1955).
'0 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838, 868 (1955).
" ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 800 (1955).
"2 Foreign Charter Service Investigation, Order No. E-9127, May 19, 1955, Docket No. 7173,
later sub nom., Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation, Notice to all parties, Jan. 30, 1956.
"3 Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958.
'422 C.A.B. 838 (1955).
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and growth for the non-skeds. The Board praised the role of the irregular
carriers as innovators, especially as to coach service and charters. Dr.
Charles Cherington, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administra-
tion at Harvard, had testified that the irregular carriers would be good
for testing and developing new markets, one of which was the foreign
charter field. It was recognized that in the domestic field the scheduled
carriers had done little to develop the charter market. Therefore the
irregular carriers were given an exemption to fly an unlimited number
of domestic charter flights.' However, the Board refused to go beyond
the 'Transatlantic Charter Policy of 1955" so far as international charters
were concerned.
Since the scheduled carriers had already absorbed a great deal of subsidy
the Board concluded that individually ticketed operations across the
Atlantic by the non-skeds should not be permitted." Having reached this
conclusion, the Board was afraid that a grant of blanket authority to
fly charters would encourage spurious charter flights as a way of getting
around the single ticket restriction.2 The same problem did not exist in
the domestic field since the irregulars were permitted to conduct a certain
amount of individually ticketed service anyway. The Board also reasoned
that transatlantic passengers tend to stay at their destinations for longer
eriods of time than domestic passengers. They thought that this would
uild up pressure for the carriers to find back-hauls which would lead
them to circumvent the rules.2
In 195 5 the Board also had occasion to pass on a proposal made by a num-
ber of non-scheduled airlines to allow their Air Charter Exchange to solicit
commercial charter business.2" Since 1951 the exchange had been aiding
military operations with a central communications and control board in
Washington." This enabled the combined fleet to provide quicker service
and cut down on ferry mileage. 3 The Board permitted the exchange to ex-
tend its activity to the domestic commercial market but cited the need for a
backlog of experience before extending this authority abroad.' Approval
of the plan would not have eliminated the need for individual exemptions.
The limitation to domestic commercial charters was something of a
handicap. Since the same planes might be flying military and commercial
missions on consecutive flights it was more difficult to coordinate the two
kinds of traffic."'
Developments in 1955 and 1956 showed the difficulty which the CAB
faced in achieving a lower transatlantic fare structure. In 195 5 the Board
approved the IATA fare proposals but warned that the general level over
the North Atlantic was too high and urged a reduction. IATA pro-
ceeded to raise first class fares ten percent although it made no change
23Id. at 911.
28 Id. at 866.
2720 C.A.B. 782 (1955).
28 Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 838, 940 (1955).
2
9 1d. at 865.
30 Ibid.
21 ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760 (195 5).
3 Clayton Burwell, Pres., Independent Airlines Ass'n, Lecture on Supplemental Air Carrier
Service at American Univ. School of Bus. Admin., Nov. 11, 1960, p. 14 (mim.).23 Id. at 16.
'
4 ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 22 C.A.B. 760, 768 (1955).
35 Burwell, supra note 32, at 15.
'
8 IATA Traffc Conference Meeting, Order No. E-9161, March 21, 1955.
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in tourist rates. In February 1956 the Board refused to approve the IATA
fares, saying that it thought that the relatively high load factor on the
North Atlantic did not justify an increase.37 It approved the tourist rates
although it thought them high. Pressure from IATA lead the Board to
reverse itself. It approved the IATA fares before the start of the 1956
season."8 Later that year a compromise was reached which was suitable
to the CAB. IATA agreed to put new low fares into effect beginning
April 1958, not as soon as the CAB had wanted but closer to what it
had asked for."
The 1955 Transatlantic Charter Policy"' marked the start of a period
of continuous growth in charter operations. Much of this business went
to the supplemental carriers although the scheduled carriers also showed
a steady annual increase. 4' By 1957 the Flying Tiger Line had become
the largest charter operator in any class.4" In that year it carried 15,000
commercial charter passengers and had revenues from this source alone of
52 million dollars. Most of this business was from clubs and college
groups."3 Pan American and KLM ranked first and second among the
scheduled operators. TWA, further down the North Atlantic charter list
had charter revenues of 1,326,000 dollars in 1957." The total IATA North
Atlantic charter figure went above 50,000 in 1957 from 39,500 in 1955.
However, scheduled traffic had grown faster than charter traffic among
the IATA carriers. 4' During the peak season from April 1 to September
30, charters accounted for 6'2 percent of all North Atlantic traffic."
This percentage was to grow in future years.
The CAB continued to refine the standards by which it would allow
forming of charter groups. It issued no new regulation in 1956 but de-
cided one case which limited the size of eligible organizations. The Na-
tional Education Association advertised charter flights among its members
through its own academic and professional journals and faculty notice
boards. This ordinarily would not have been considered "public solicita-
tion." However, the group was denied a charter because it had a total
membership of 600,000 members which was held to be so large as not to
be sufficiently distinguishable from the general public.4
In 1957 the Board issued a new policy statement making many of the
criteria more specific,4' based upon experience in administering the 1955
Policy. The new statement showed the influence of IATA Charter Resolu-
tion 045. The Board stated that there had been numerous occasions where
airlines had not complied with the Board's policy. The Board warned that
it was going to require stricter compliance and that it had decided to
incorporate the various parts of the policy as express conditions of the
exemption order. Violations were to be turned over to the Office of Com-
a
7IATA Traffic Conference Resolutions, Order No. E-9969, Oct. 8, 1955.
31Order No. E-10017, Feb. 20, 1956.
I ATA Traffic Conference Meeting, Order No. E-10530, May 29, 1956.
,020 C.A.B. 782 (1955).
41 IATA, World Air Transport Statistics 39 (1960).
4' Garrison, Transatlantic Charter Growth Foreseen, Aviation Week, June 2, 1958, p .28.
43 Ibid.
4Ibid.
41 IATA, supra note 41, at 39.
"Proposed Rule, 25 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
41 Order No. E-10057, March 1, 1956.
4'Regulation Policy Statement No. 2, 22 Fed. Reg. 2241 (1957), superseded Jan. 7, 1958,
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pliance for appropriate action."' In order to provide more time to examine
"complex and novel questions of policy or law"5 the Board extended the
filing time from 30 to 60 days before the flight date." The Board was not
alone in passing on these questions. Under the exemption procedure, ap-
plications could be and often were opposed by other airlines."
The scheduled carriers still enjoyed a right of first refusal. However,
the route carrier could not pre-empt the non-sked's application if it
charged in excess of 5 % more for the same equipment. If the regular car-
rier provided a better plane, it was allowed to bid ten percent more and
still keep the job. The Board also reserved the right to decide that the
non-sked's offer was unreasonably low or that seating density was too
high, thus further protecting the route carriers." As matters developed
this right of first refusal was not often used by the scheduled carriers
during 1957.' 4
Methods of solicitation were more closely limited. The policy did not
permit the carriers to employ anyone for the purpose of assembling mem-
bers of a charter party into a group. Travel agents were allowed to act
only after the members had formed the charter group."
The Board established the "six months" rule for members of the
charter group. If members of less than six months standing participated
in the charter, the club assumed the burden of proving affirmatively that
it had not solicited the public. National and state-wide organizations of
"substantial size" were barred because they constituted too large a part
of the public," thereby codifying the National Education Association
Case."
A list of thirty-two detailed questions about the chartering organiza-
tion had to be answered. Any one of a number of detailed rules could be
grounds for denial of exemption.
The Board stated that in deciding whether a particular exemption should
be granted it would employ a "case-to-case basis" in the light of the
statutory standards of Section 416 (b) of the Act.' The American Air-
lines case of 1956" required the CAB to make specific findings in exemp-
tion cases, not to mouth statutory standards in conclusory fashion. The
case had upset the Board's regulation of irregular carriers and undoubtedly
influenced its thinking as to the use of Section 416 (b). However, ruling
on exemptions became a matter of routine.
At the end of the 1957 tourist season the Board invited comments and,
after hearing oral argument, issued a new policy for 1958."8 The Board was
concerned with the fact that many groups had discovered that they were
49 See text, infra page .
"Statement No. 2, supra note 48.
"Id. at § 399.28(a).
2 14 C.F.R. § 302; See text, infra. p.
a" Statement No. 2, supra note 48, at § 399.28(c). The regulation on filing tariffs was amended
to make it possible for non-certificated carriers to file tariffs for proposed service even though
they had not yet received an exemption allowing the service. ER-220, Amend. No. 1 to pt. 221,
adopted Mar. 28, 1957, effective April 4, 1957.
'4 Regulation Policy Statement No. 3, S 399.29, effective Jan. 7, 1958.
"Statement No. 2, supra note 48, at § 399.28 (g,h).
" Id. at § 399.28(i).
"TOrder No. E-10057, March 1, 1956.
5 7 2 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. 1386.
"'American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
60 See text, infra. p. -.
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ineligible at the last minute. For this reason the Board undertook to spell
out for the first time just what sort of groups would be eligible. In
practice the Board had been forming administrative rules in the course
of rendering exemption decisions. Until now these were not easily avail-
able to the average group interested in chartering.
Specific numerical standards for the chartering organization were arti-
culated. A local group could have 20,000 members whereas state-wide
and nation-wide groups were limited to 10,000 and 5,000 members
respectively. However, if there were some basis for selecting individuals
from among a large group, so that the chartering class was limited, its
absolute size might not be a bar. 2 The "six months" rule was continued,
but this requirement was read in light of the "real interest" which the
member had in joining the group based on difficulty in obtaining mem-
bership and the amount of time spent in the club's activities."s Groups
were cautioned against allowing items to appear in the general press if
likely to induce travel on the chartered plane. 4
In the name of administrative convenience, the allowable activities of
travel agents were very narrowly defined. An agent was not permitted to
lay out money in order to aid a chartering organization in making up a
brochure to aid the group in solicitation among its own members." The
agents complained that the Aviation Act makes no mention of their
industry; 6 nonetheless, so long as the Board decided when the public
interest justified granting an exemption there was little that they could do.
It had been suggested by some of the carriers that two groups be
allowed to share an airplane. The advent of larger planes was making it
more difficult for legitimate groups to charter a transatlantic craft,
especially when the definition of eligible groups was gradually becoming
more circumscribed. The Board rejected a "split-charter" rule saying that
this would lead to a breakdown between charter and individually ticketed
services. There might be hardship cases if it developed that one group
was not eligible. The Board could also foresee the temptation to form an
artificial fill-up group if a charterer could only fill half the airplane.67
The rule against mingling passengers where more than one round trip
was chartered was tightened so that one-way passengers were prohibited
if the group had chartered a round trip."
Forms were provided for the charterer, the agent, and the carrier to
fill out. Chartering groups were asked to provide lists of their complete
membership with addresses as well as passenger lists. Objectives, member-
ship qualifications, and other details had to be provided. These requests
undoubtedly stemmed from a sincere desire to obtain sufficient informa-
tion to advise a group of its status; but this requirement placed a con-
siderable burden upon the organization and the carrier. However, at least
one writer at the time said that the Board's fuller articulation of require-
ments in 1958 made things a little easier for all parties concerned. 8
As an aid to non-scheduled carriers the Board ended the right of first
12Id. at § 399.29 (C) (1).
63 Ibid.
64 Statement No. 3, supra note 54.
65 Id., Explanatory Statement.
66 Winchester, Mass Passenger Transportation by Charter Aircraft, Flying, May 1960, p. 89, 92.
67 Statement No. 3, supra note 54, Explanatory Statement.
nId. at § 399.29 (C) (4).
66 Garrison, supra note 42.
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refusal that existed until 1958. First refusal was only to apply during the
off-season. The Board concluded that since the right had been used in-
frequently in 1957 there was no reason for extending this "artificial
priority" in view of the other competitive advantages which the scheduled
carriers enjoyed. '
The scheduled lines did not need prior permission to fly charters. The
CAB changes, narrowing the eligible group standard, had not been ap-
plied to the route carriers. However, IATA Charter Resolution 045 set
its own fairly strict "prior affinity" standard for eligible groups.
Until 1958 the activities of the foreign carriers in the charter field had
been regulated principally by IATA. In August 1958 the Board issued a
regulation governing part of the charter operations of foreign air carriers.71
This was the culmination of a proceeding which had been launched the
day before the 1955 Transatlantic Policy had been handed down.
The purpose of the Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation
7
2
was to provide a legitimate legal basis under which holders of foreign
air carrier permits could conduct off-route charter operations. The foreign
carriers already had authority to conduct charters on their regular routes."3
However, off-route charter operations had been conducted under a Sec-
tion of the Air Commerce Act of 1928 7 which was not even designed to
apply to aircraft engaged in common carriage.7 ' No statute allowed off-
route flights in common carriage by foreign air-carriers. The Aviation
Act is quite specific about the need for a permit for these activities.7 ' The
Board is permitted to grant exemptions only to American carriers under
Section 416 (b) .7
Since foreign countries liberally permitted American planes to fly off-
route charters, 8 the CAB had stretched a point and allowed foreign car-
riers to conduct charter operations under the existing statute. The CAB
had administered the Air Commerce Act since 1953.7' In the interim ap-
proximately 4060 foreign off-route charter flights were authorized." A
small number of applications had been denied because of their common
carriage aspects but the rest of the operation were permitted to con-
tinue in what was called a "legal no-man's land.""1 Although the Board
evidently was willing to stretch a point to allow foreign charter opera-
tions, it had taken a very different view when a decision on the same com-
mon carriage issue involved the non-certificated lines eight years before."
As a result of the investigation the permits of all foreign carriers were
70 Regulation Policy Statement No. 3, 14 C.F.R. § 399.29(D).
7114. C.F.R. § 212 (1958).
72
Docket 7173, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958.7
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Sept. 8, 1958.
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7' Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation, supra note 73, Examiner's Recommended
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7' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 402, 72 Star. 757, 49 U.S.C. 1372.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 416, 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. 1386.
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85 Id. at 2.
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Seaboard E Western Airlines, 11 C.A.B. 372 (1950).
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amended to allow them to conduct off-route charter operations."3 The
Board also issued a regulation by which it reserved the right to decide
whether individual flights should be authorized on a case-by-case basis.8"
Both the Bureau Counsel and TWA urged that all charter activities of
foreign carriers be governed by the new regulation."s This proposal was
rejected, however, and no CAB regulation has yet been issued governing
foreign on-route charters.
The 1958 regulation provided for issuance of Certificates of Authoriza-
tion on a "public interest" standard." There was no numerical limit on
frequency of operations but frequency was declared to be one criterion.8
In order to specify the standards which would be applied under the
regulation, a Statement of General Policy was issued interpreting Part
212 of the CAB Economic Regulations.8 This document set forth many
of the same standards applicable to the irregular carriers. There were some
differences, however. Numerical limitations on the size of groups were not
imposed, but size and area of residence were to be considered.8 "Reason-
able" organization expenses were allowed but no dollar amount was
specified.
One of the issues debated in the investigation was the eligibility of
'spontaneous groups."" As mentioned before the Board felt strongly that
these groups should be legally eligible. It had conditioned approval of the
IATA Resolution 045 stating that approval would not be given unless
IATA's "prior affinity" rule" were modified to allow spontaneous groups
organized without public solicitation." The trial examiner's report em-
phasized the point that the Board had always considered this important.'"
Subsequently IATA amended Resolution 045 by adding a provision speci-
fically called Charters for Spontaneous Groups." However, only by the
closest reading of the Board's own rules, is one able to see how a spon-
taneous group might be eligible. The regulation of 1959 makes the pos-
sibility seem even more remote."'
The procedure which the foregn carriers had to follow was simpler
than that required of the non-skeds. Instead of the 60 days notice required
of the non-skeds, applications were required only five days in advance.8
The foreign carriers were required to submit a simple one sheet applica-
tion.' It was not necessary to serve carriers certificated to fly the proposed
83 Order No. E-12945, Aug. 12, 1958 (date of amending).
84Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation, E-12945 Sept. 8, 1958, p. 20; 14 C.F.R.
§ 212 (1958).
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route." The Board ruled that any further requirements imposed on the
foreign carriers would be unduly burdensome."'
Economy fares were introduced in 1958' making it possible to fly round
trip to London for $450. There was still a great deal of incentive to form
charter groups. Traveling by charter saved a minimum of $150 and pos-
sibly $200 on a New York-London round-trip. On longer trips the savings
were even greater.
The 1958 fares were not as low as the CAB had wanted, and when the
jet supercharge became prevalent in 1959 the charter market boomed.
Foreign off-route operations increased ten percent.! IATA charters rose
from 90,000 in 1958 to 172,000 in 1959.' As an aid to enforcement, the
Transatlantic Charter Policy was issued in regulation form just before
the 1959 summer session. The new regulation brought no important
changes,' but it was intended that the regulation form would provide
greater "stability and legal effect." Evidently this was greatly needed.
Problems of enforcement had substantially increased. The N.Y. Times
reported that the system was "growing out of hand . . . the way dis-
count houses had grown around retail stores.! The situation was described
as "reminiscent of the last days of the Volstead Act."' Reports indicated
that in New York City it was possible to join an organization retro-
actively for a fee of six dollars and thus become "eligible" for a charter
trip. Some agents were ready to enroll the traveler in any one of a number
of groups in order to fit their plans.9
The situation presented a dilemma for the honest traveler who did not
wish to violate the Board's rules but, wanting to save money, saw the
rules being violated all about him.1" In reply the CAB said that the number
of violations had been decreasing. It was aware of the economic incentives
present and the temptation to break the rules. However, it had faith in
the fact that most Americans were law abiding people and that with
greater knowledge of the charter requirements it was thought that they
would comply with the rules rather than try to evade them." No one
denied that there was a problem, but there was disagreement as to whether
it was a mere question of enforcement or an issue of basic policy. There
was no indication that any policy change was in the offing.
The Board's decisions under the regulations did not always clarify the
situation, which had, at times confused travel agents, clubs and airlines.
The United Nations Flying Club, with a membership of less than one
9"14 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (1958).
100 Foreign Off-Route Charter Service Investigation, supra note 94, at 21.
IATA, World Air Transport Statistics 4 (1960).
1959 CAB Ann. Rep. 29.
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eliminated completely. The draft release had included the refusal right, Draft release No. 102, 23
Fed. Reg. 9784 (1958), but the final version excluded it. Part 295, ER-273, 24 Fed. Reg. 4907
(1959).
'Explanatory Statement, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, EDR-21, 25 Fed. Reg. 10944,
10945 (1960).
' Friedlander, Air Fares in Turbulence, N. Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1959, § 2, p. 21, col. 1.
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9 Ibid.
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hundred people, was given permission to include employees of the
U.N. and its special agencies and members of missions to the U.N. in
its charter group. When this did not prove sufficient to provide a
plane-load the group was extended to include newsmen who covered the
U.N. and various service employees. This seemed like a loose application
of the CAB's "bona fide group" concept, especially after the second
solicitation was made. On July 17, 1959 the CAB decided that this flight
qualified under the rules." A CAB official said that if all the people who
worked in the Empire State Building wanted to set up a charter this
would constitute a legitimate group so long as no more than 20,000
people worked there." In light of the Board's generally strict insistence on
bona fide membership, these interpretations were somewhat puzzling.
Early in 1959 the CAB had issued a new opinion in the Large Irregular
Air Carrier Investigation." Certificates were issued in place of the ex-
emptions under which the irregular carriers had previously operated
since the courts had placed limitations on the use of exemptions." The
services permitted the supplemental carriers were basically those which
had been permitted under the exemptions. No change was made in the
transatlantic situation. The Board stated, however, that the fate of the
supplemental carriers in the foreign field would be made the subject of
a future decision."
The Board was also studying the matter of amending Part 207 so that
certificated United States carriers would come under the same rules which
governed other carriers." In December 1959 it had tentatively imposed
certain conditions on IATA Resolution 045 in an attempt to make the
rules for all carriers uniform." The following March, after comment had
been filed, the Board compromised on certain IATA rules but insisted that
IATA follow the CAB in imposing very strict rules on travel agents so
that there would be no opportunity for them to "succumb to economic
temptation."" A new edition of Part 295 ' incorporating a more liberal
IATO standard for group size was issued in time for the 1960 season. The
Board also revealed that it was studying the possibility of issuing regula-
tions specifically applying to foreign on-route charters."
A pair of decisions made in 1959 and 1960 showed an increasing atti-
tude toward encouragement of the supplemental carriers. In the Independ-
ent Airlines Association Commercial Charter Exchange case," the Board
removed the restrictions imposed in 1955 which barred the exchange from
commercial operations in the foreign field." It accepted the position of the
Independent Airlines Association that any new business would come from
"N.Y. Times, July 26, 1959, § 2, p. 17, col. 7.
"Ibid.
14 Order No. E-13436, effective Jan. 29, 1959.
"American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956); in connection with issuance of
certificates, the Board promulgated ER-263, Amendment No. 1 to Part 207, effective March 30,
1959, which made it clear that Part 207 did not apply to the new certificated supplemental
carriers.
"6 1959 CAB Ann. Rep. 29.
17Id. at 30.
"Order No. E-14789, Dec. 29, 1959.
1Order No. E-15047, March 28, 1960.
2"ER-305, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
21 Order No. E-15047, March 28, 1960, at 5.
2Order No. E-14638, Nov. 12, 1959, Docket No. 6580.
" ACTA-IMATA Commercial Charter Investigation, 20 C.A.B. 760 (195 5).
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"untapped potential" or from increased competition with foreign carriers'
agreeing there was no showing that certificated carriers would be affected.
The decision made it easier for supplementals to coordinate civilian and
military passenger and cargo flights so that idle ferry mileage would be
reduced and the carriers would be in a better bidding position.' Five
months later the Board denied the scheduled airlines permission to com-
bine efforts to help charter business holding that it would violate the anti-
trust laws and hurt the supplemental airlines.28 The position of the sup-
plementals had shifted.
As mentioned previously27 the 1960 charter season turned out to be
a record one in many respects. Charter flights accounted for eleven
per cent of transatlantic air traffic. The CAB admitted in November that
there had been a defect in its policy of using the supplemental carriers as
a stop gap measure. Without a certain amount of security, their avail-
ability was being endangered. Even with the advent of jets, it was not
always possible to find aircraft available for charter service. It was noted
that the identity of the carriers participating in the charter trade had not
been consistent from year to year. In the early years the certificated cargo
carriers had ocupied an important share of the market. " Seaboard &
Western, for example, relied heavily on charter flights as an aid to its
scheduled cargo service. 9 Participation by the certified cargo lines has
diminished in recent years while the proportion of charters carried by the
supplementals has increased."8 The supplementals objected to the lack of
stability of the market, saying that competition from the scheduled lines
in the charter field was not predictable. It was their view that protection
was needed because the scheduled airlines were "sporadically throwing
large amounts of surplus equipment into the charter field with little con-
tinuity or permanence of purpose." Therefore it was suggested that the
scheduled airlines be limited in their rights to conduct charter flights."
The Board took note of the fact that the complicated procedures neces-
sary to conduct charter flights had a definite influence of the attractive-
ness of the market to the smaller operators and that the route carriers
might not maintain a piston aircraft fleet to serve a seasonal market. Jet
capacity and costs made them less practical for charters." Therefore the
Board decided to review the field and instituted the Transatlantic Charter
Investigation to determine whether it would be advisable to grant certifi-
cates to non-route carriers so that they might be prepared to supplement
the scheduled carriers by providing charter service on a sustained basis."
While the Investigation is pending, the Board has granted seasonal
exemptions to carriers applying for certificates. The exemptions run from
April to September and are renewable each year. The basic requirements
1
4 Order No. E-14638, Nov. 12, 1959, at 13.
clayton Burwell, Pres., Independent Airlines Ass'n, Lecture on Supplemental Air Carrier
Service at American Univ. School of Bus. Admin., Nov. 11, 1960, p. 15 (mim.); Order No.
E-14638, Nov. 12, 1959, at 12.
2 N.Y. Times, April 10, 1960, p. 32, col. 6.
27 See text, supra page -
282 5 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
'Independent Airlines Ass'n, Commercial Charter Exchange, Order No. E-14638, Nov. 12,
1959, p. 12.
3025 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
1 Burwell, supra note 25, at 28.
2 25 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
"Order No. E-16023, Nov. 14, 1960.
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for a charter group are unchanged but it is no longer necessary for carriers
to receive individual exemptions for each flight. If the charter does not
completely conform to Part 295, a request for waiver will have to be
presented at least thirty days before the proposed flight."4 The Board has
said that it eliminated the requirement of individual approval because it
now believes that the standards for charter eligibility are sufficiently precise
and understandable so as to preclude violations on a large scale. 5
The Board expects this result because of the great administrative and
economic burden involved, and because of the competitive disadvantage
stemming from the charterer's knowing that specific authorization had
to be obtained from the Board."5
Following a season of poor business on the Atlantic in 1961, IATA
came forward with a proposal to carry groups of twenty-five or more
persons traveling in economy class service at a reduction of thirty-eight
per cent from normal fares. This plan makes possible a New York-London
trip for $300 and is available to both "prior affinity" and "spontaneous"
groups." Its impact on charter business has been immediate. Flying Tiger
reported that twenty of its charter contracts were canceled with the an-
nouncement of group fares. The CAB held a hearing on the group rates
on March 27, 1962. At this hearing many of the supplemental carriers
opposed the rates on the grounds that the lower fares would ruin their
charter business. Nonetheless, on April 16, 1962, the Board approved the
group fares through next year, saying that the new rates would help the
scheduled carriers fill empty seats. Two Board Members suggested that the
Part 295 carriers be allowed to sell split charters to groups of fewer
than seventy."
In announcing the Transatlantic Charter Investigation the Board
evinced an interest in creating a new class of international airline with
permanent authority to fly charters. Its decision on group fares will no
doubt be crucial to any decision it may make in the Investigation.
III. LEGAL BASIS; INTERPRETATION AND ADMINISTRATION
In recent years the CAB has been working toward uniform charter
standards for all classes of carriers under its jurisdiction.3 Due to a
difference of position in the regulatory scheme, a variety of techniques
has been used in an attempt to achieve this end. An understanding of the
way charter flights are regulated requires an exploration of the different
ways in which the problem has been attacked.
Three main classes of air carriers are concerned with providing trans-
atlantic charter service. They are (1) United States route carriers, certi-
ficated to fly passengers across the Atlantic, (2) foreign air carriers, and
(3) United States supplemental and cargo carriers. Each is regulated in a
different way.
A. Foreign Air Carriers
There were no CAB regulations concerning charters by foreign air
4 Part 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
"5Proposed Regulation, § 295.3, 25 Fed. Reg. 10944, 10945 (1960).
38Part 295 Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
37 Order No. E-18075, March 5, 1962, approving the plan until May 31, 1962.
"8N.Y. Times, April 17, 1962, p. 57, col. 1.
"o 1959 CAB Ann. Rep. 30.
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carriers until the Foreign Off-route Charter Investigation of 195840 As
a result of the Investigation a regulation was issued governing flights con-
ducted off the routes for which the carriers held permits.41 There are no
CAB regulations for on-route charters. Therefore charters by foreign
carriers are regulated in two different ways.
1. On-route Charters.
a. The Role of IATA.--Control of on-route charters has been main-
tained by resolutions of the International Air Transport Association.
Agreements must be unanimous. Since each member has a veto on all
resolutions, many are products of extensive compromise." In keeping with
the terms of the Chicago Convention of 1944,43 Section 402 of the Federal
Aviation Act provides for granting permits to foreign air carriers, speci-
fying the points between which the carrier may engage in air transporta-
tion. Clearly charter flights are "air transportation."" Therefore these
carriers may fly charters on their permitted routes.
For many years IATA has had a resolution governing charter flights.
Under the Federal Aviation Act, United States carriers must file copies of
inter-airline contracts with the CAB.4 Section 412(b) of the Act gives
the Board the power to disapprove contracts which it finds are not in the
public interest. Approval by the Board provides immunity from anti-
trust laws." Without immunity many IATA agreements would be illegal."
IATA Resolution 045, concerning charters, has been approved and
amended by IATA members on a year to year basis. Each time that the
resolution is renewed the Board has the opportunity to pass on its terms.
In reviewing IATA Charter Resolution 045 the CAB has used the tech-
nique of conditional approval. The Board lists the conditions under which
it will find that the agreement is not adverse to the public interest." A
literal reading of the conditioning orders makes it seem that failure of
IATA to include the condition in its resolution will automatically result
in disapproval by the CAB. s However, the Board has been more flexible
in this respect. At least one writer has suggested that these conditions are
merely indications by the CAB as to what it wants the next IATA con-
ference to adopt. '" Even if IATA does not adopt the Board's conditions, its
members are still bound by the terms of the old resolution." Flat dis-
approval would leave IATA members with no rule, something the CAB
has never done.
40 Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958.
41 14C.F.R. § 212 (1958).
1' See generally "Statement by the Director General of IATA" in "Monopoly Problems in
Regulated Industries", Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, H. of R., 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, Airlines 1072 (1956). Provisions for the
Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Conferences of IATA, 5 IATA Bull. 19-22 (June 1947).
'Convention in International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Art. 1, 61 Star. 1180, T.I.A.S.
1591 (effective April 4, 1947).
"Foreign Off-route Charter Serivce Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 2,
Examiner's Recommended Decision 2, 6.
4'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 712(a).46 Id., § 414.
41 Price fixing, for example, is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
4 Bebchick, The IATA and the CAB, 25 J. Air Law & Comm. 8, 13 (1958).
" E.g., In the Matter of an agreement adopted by the Traffic Conference of the IATA relating
to Charters, Order No. E-15047, March 28, 1960, p. 5.





JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
In one case the Board attempted to get IATA to modify its "prior
affinity" rule on charter group eligibility. It first conditioned the resolu-
tion in February 1954."2 It was not until 1958 that IATA amended its
resolution to include the "spontaneous group" provision," although the
Board had repeatedly conditioned the resolution in the interim." The
change came when it became certain that the Board was going to step in
and issue its own regulation on the subject."5
In a recent incident the CAB took a more restrictive attitude. On March
28, 1960 the Board approved Resolution 045 subject to the condition that
IATA follow a "no mingling rule" in cases where a group contracts for
more than one round trip. The Board's theory was that if passengers do
not move in plane-load groups the charter concept breaks down and ap-
proaches the single ticket idea."
The IATA resolution was to go into effect on April 1, 1960 so that
the members did not have a chance to approve the CAB conditions and
make them part of their agreement. Five IATA members had filed com-
ments contesting parts of the conditioning order as a result of a tentative
announcement in December 19595' but IATA had not changed its posi-
tion. The IATA rules say that the organization will only enforce a "com-
mitment assumed through individual ratification by the members."'" The
Board's order indicated, however, that it assumed that its condition bound
IATA members ex proprio vigore.' When IATA members continued to
conduct charters without obeying the "no mingling" rule, the Board said
that it was "considerably disturbed" that this should occur after the effec-
tive date of the Board's condition.5 It spoke of the condition as having
been "finalized, effective April 1" an d said that it would communicate
with the carriers because of the "apparent violation" of the condition."1
There was evidence that IATA carriers had advised customers that ming-
ling was permissible after the date of the Board's condition." The precise
enforcement status of these conditions is not clear. Under the provisions
of the Chicago Convention the Board does have the power to regulate
non-scheduled traffic,8 and has done so in the case of off-route charters."
It is doubtful that conditioning the IATA resolution has the same result
as the formal issuance of a Board regulation, which may be one reason
" Pan American World Airways Inc., Et. Al., Re Rate Matters and Traffic Matters, 18 C.A.B.
648 (1954).
3 IATA Charter Resolution 045 4(b).
14Order No. E-9969, Feb. 2, 1956.
55 Foreign Off-route Charter Serivce Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 13.
58 In the matter of an agreement adopted by the Traffic Conference of IATA relating to charters,
Order No. E-1 5047, March 28, 1960.
57 Ibid.; Order No. E-14789, Dec. 29, 1959.
"8 Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Conferences of IATA, 5 IATA
Bull. 19 (June 1947). However, Resolution 001 (7) provides, in substance, where a government
imposes a condition in its approval of a resolution, such resolution shall not become effective if,
within 30 days, any member advises the Executive Secretary that it opposes the resolution as ap-
proved subject to condition. If such notice is not received the condition becomes legally binding
among members. Thus, the condition can become part of the operative resolution despite the fact
that the resolution is not rewritten to embody formally the language of the condition.
"' Order No. E-15047, supra note 56.
"0Seaboard & Western Airlines, Order No. E-15364, June 10, 1960, p. 2.
61 Ibid.
6 Flying Tiger Line, Order No. E-1 5496, June 22, 1960, pp. 2, 3.
"3Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Art. 5, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
1591 (effective April 4, 1947).
8414 C.F.R. § 212 (1959).
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why the Board is studying the idea of amending its regulations to apply
to on-route charters." As a practical matter there is a strong incentive
for IATA to observe the Board's conditions. If at any time Resolution 045
should get too far from what the Board wants, the Board could always
issue its own regulation instead of delegating the task to IATA.
b. IATA Enforcement and Procedure.-The CAB relies upon IATA
to police its own resolutions. Under IATA rules members can be fined
up to $25,000 for violations. The organization has its own staff of
enforcement officers which conduct field investigations and act on com-
plaints from competing member airlines.' " IATA agents visit airline
offices periodically to inspect charter contracts. Violations are referred to
the Director General of IATA who appoints a three man commission to
review cases.67
The enforcement proceedings of IATA have generally been kept secret."
As a rule the results of decisions are only circulated among the member
airlines." Several years ago, in response to the demands of the House Anti-
Trust subcommittee, IATA released a partial list of its enforcement pro-
ceedings. Out of twenty-four cases mentioned, two involved charters.
The exact nature of the violations was not specified and neither case re-
sulted in fining although it was not clear that there was "no violation." 6
Prior clearance is not required for IATA members conducting charter
flights. As an initial step, the chartering organization is presented with a
charter application.' This blank requires information about the purpose
of the organization, its articles and by-laws, its size, the type of soliciting
material used and many other details. The charterer is asked to warrant that
all answers as to the bona fides of the group are correct. The carrier has
a cancellation privilege if it "becomes aware of any conditions which are
inconsistent with the rules and regulations of proper aeronautical author-
ities.""2 This application is retained by the carrier. It is not a contract.
The carrier is not bound at this point.
The charterer is next confronted with the standard airline charter con-
tract. The terms stated appear to be fairly simple and to the point."3 One
clause stipulates that the terms of IATA 045 are incorporated as part of
the contract and that the charterer warrants that IATA 045 has been
complied with as if it were set out in full."4 Resolution 045 is a ten page,
intricate document written in a very confusing style. To make things
more complex, Resolution 045 ends with the caveat that it is subject to
"applicable government reservations." It is not easy for the charterer to
65 Agreement adopted by the Traffic Conference of IATA relating to charters, Order No.
E-15047, March 28, 1960, p. 5.
66"How IATA Curbs the Maverick Lines, American Aviation, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 57; IATA,
World Air Transport Background, No. 4 (1957) (mim.)
6721 IATA Bull. 115.
6 American Aviation, supra note 66.
6921 IATA Bull. 115.
"O"Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries," Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary, H. of R., 84th Cong., 2nd. Sess., Part 1, Airlines, 1069 (1956).
List of Cases decided by IATA enforcement commissions concerning charters in which U.S.
carriers were involved:
PAA & TWA v. KLM; no fine, notification. PAA v. Swissair; no penalty.
71 lATA, Charter Application, Sept. 17, 1960 (mim.).
72 id. at 3.
" See, e.g., British Overseas Airways Corporation, Charter Contract.
74 Id., cl. 14.
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know what reservations are currently outstanding and to be sure of their
current status. A charter transaction is not a simple one.
c. Foreign Carriers Outside IATA.-All of the scheduled transatlantic
airlines are members of IATA except for Icelandic Airlines. Because of
its unique situation Icelandic does not come under either the CAB charter
regulations or IATA 045. It is a small line and does not usually seek
charter business." This is partly because it is free to set its own prices on
individually ticketed fares and charges less than any other scheduled
transatlantic airline. Icelandic evidently feels the effect of competition
from the charter trade which undercuts even its low fares. Its president
thinks that there has been abuse in the charter field. He has said, "It has
gotten to the point where people with brown eyes organize a club to
arrange a charter flight to Europe."
2. Off-route Charters.
a. Background.-Holders of foreign air carrier permits conducting
charter operations in other than their scheduled routes fall under both
IATA Charter Resolution 045, which makes no distinction based on
routes, and under regulations promulgated by the CAB.
At the conclusion of the Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation
the Board amended the permits of foreign carriers, allowing them "to en-
gage in charter trips in foreign air transportation without regard to points
named in the foreign air carrier permit. . . ."" The Chicago Convention
provides that each participating state may regulate international non-
scheduled operations conducted for hire." The Board's rule, Part 212,
provides that for each off-route charter flight conducted there must be a
finding by the Board that the trip is in the public interest.7 The regula-
tion offers several criteria defining public interest. These include (1)
whether the carrier has frequently conducted similar flights, (2) whether
the public was solicited in forming the charter group, and (3) whether
the carrier has previously violated the regulation." At the time that Part
212 was promulgated a document called "tRegulation Policy Statement
No. 5" was issued." It described in detailed language what the Board
meant by "public interest." It is not referred to in Part 212. The Policy
Statement said that it could not cover all of the Board's standards since
"determination of the public interest requires consideration of all the
standards set forth in the Civil Aeronautics Act."" At one point in 1960
it was necessary to have not only Part 212 and Regulation Policy State-
ment No. 5 but also a copy of an order modifying the Policy Statement."
The policy statement does not say that it is subject to individual Board
orders. As a result, a request to the CAB asking for the latest regulation
on the subject or even for the latest policy statement will not always
produce all the necessary documents needed to find out the true state of
"Time, Sept. 5, 1960, pp. 67, 68; N.Y. Times, March 19, 1961, S 10, p. 5, col. 1, 2.
"Time, Sept. 5, 1960, pp. 67, 68.
7 Order No. E-12945, Aug. 12, 1958; Permit to Foreign Air Carrier, as amended, persuant to
Order No. E-12945, approved Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sept. 6, 1958.
"Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, Art. 5, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
1591 (effective April 4, 1947).
7"14 C.F.R. 5212.6(a) (1958).
"0 14 C.F.R. 5 212.6(b).
" 14 C.F.R. 5 399.30 (1958).
"I Id., General Provisions.
"Order No. E-15047, March 28, 1960.
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the law on this subject. This can be confusing for a potential charterer.
The Board has issued a new policy statement replacing Statement No. 5.
This new document incorporates by reference many of the provisions of
Part 295, applying to supplemental and cargo carriers. ' Standards for
these two groups are now almost the same.
b. Procedure.-In order to secure permission for an off-route charter
flight it is necessary to submit a form to the Board at least five days in
advance of the proposed flight. If good cause is shown this period can be
shortened.'" The application is published in the "Weekly List of Applica-
tions Filed." The purpose of publication is to give competing carriers an
opportunity to contest the grant of a Statement of Authorization. The
application and supporting documents, if any, are open for public inspec-
tion at CAB offices.86 However, because the application form does not
provide very much information, it is difficult to see if the carrier has
complied with the rules on the basis of the application alone. Since copies
do not have to be served on interested parties and since the Board may act
before the five day period has expired, there is little opportunity to con-
test these applications. The Board has decided that the possible burden on
the applying carriers outweighs the harm to other airlines in these
situations."
After the Board has processed an application the result of its action
is published in the "Status of Charter Applications" attached to the
"'Weekly List of Applications Filed." A letter is sent to the applicant
giving notice of the decision. Copies of the letters are made available to
interested persons on request,8 but are not given the same general dis-
tribution as exemption orders under Part 295.
c. Effect of Dual Regulation.-IATA members continue to be bound
by IATA Charter Resolution 045 even though they are also subject to
the Board's regulations. IATA rules do not provide for waiver of resolu-
tions.8' Therefore approval of a charter application by the CAB does not
excuse the carrier from any of the self-imposed IATA standards."
Sometimes IATA 045 has been stricter than CAB standards. The period
when IATA rules did not provide for "spontaneous groups" is an example
of this. Even though the CAB conditioned IATA 045 so that Part 207
remained in force in its entirety, the Board's position on the "prior affinity"
rule was not readily followed." As a practical matter it is difficult for the
Board to make IATA carriers follow a more liberal standard for charter
groups than they choose to follow."
In other situations the Board's rules have been more restrictive than
IATA 045. Since prior permission is needed from the CAB in all off-route
charter cases it is the narrower standard which will prevail.
While enforcement of IATA 045 is not within the province of the
CAB, the Board will sometimes use IATA violations as an arguing point
84Regulation Policy Statement No. 11, Pt. 399.35, 25 Fed. Reg. 5327 (1960).
" 14 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1958).
811d. at § 212.5(d).
"T Foreign Off-route Charter Service Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 6, 1958, p. 21.
"s 14 C.F.R. § 212.6(c).
88 Provisions for the Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Conferences of IATA, S IATA
Bull. 19 (June 1947).
"'Regulation Policy Statement No. 11, 25 Fed. Reg. 5327, n. 3 (1960).
" Bebchick, The IATA and the CAB, 25 J. Air Law & Comm. 8, 33 (1958).
8" If discrimination is involved then S 404 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act gives the Board a
legal weapon. Free and Reduced Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
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in its own decisions. One example will show how the Board considers both
sets of rules. In May 1960 the Board denied BOAC the right to fly eight
round trip charter flights for the British legal profession whose purpose
was to attend conventions in the United States and Canada. The Board
wrote a full opinion and handed down a formal order instead of its usual
letter denying authorization." The principal problem was the size of
the group solicited. At this time the Board had no written numerical rule
as to the size of chartering organizations. The Policy Statement merely
stated that the Board would consider the size of the group and the area
of residence of the members. Two months before this case, the Board
had approved IATA 045 which allowed nation-wide groups of 15,000
to charter aircraft. 4 The Board said, however, that "in practice" it had
construed a nation-wide group in excess of 5,000 members to be one
drawn from the general public and therefore could not consider the group
as eligible. In the course of its argument the Board noted that the IATA
limit of 15,000 had been exceeded in this case and that it had no power
to grant relief from the IATA resolution. BOAC was satisfied that it came
close enough to the IATA limit so that it could carry the eight round
trip charters. If the flight had been on a regular route, BOAC could have
proceeded with the contract. If the group had been solicited from a
smaller area CAB practice would have allowed it to run as large as 20,000.
Evidently the Board thought that it was appropriate to use the same
standard for "nation-wide" groups even though the United States and
Britain are quite different in size. Although the Board's Policy Statement
is written in flexible terms this case shows that it can be rigidly applied.
One can conclude that the charterer must look for regulations, policy
statements, amending orders and rules developed "in practice" in order to
judge an organization's eligibility. These must be interpreted in the light
of the IATA resolutions with their various problems. Without criticizing
the substance of the rules themselves at this point, it seems that a better
integration of these documents might be achieved for the benefit of
chartering organizations.
B. United States Route Carriers
1. General Rules.
The right of certificated American carriers to engage in charter opera-
tions is derived directly from the words of the Federal Aviation Act Sec-
tion 401 (e). The Act provides that "any air carrier may make charter
trips . . . without regard to the points named in its certificate, under
regulations prescribed by the Board."" Part 207 of the Economic Regula-
tions has been promulgated by the CAB. " This Regulation has remained
unchanged since its first appearance." Different procedures must be
followed depending on whether or not the charter flight is being con-
ducted on the airlines' regular route.9 In addition to Part 207, the
93 Applications of BOAC, Order No. E-1 5301, May 31, 1960.
4 Order No. E-15047, March 28, 1960.
5 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C. 1371.
9'14 C.F.R. § 207 (1951).
"' There has been one technical amendment. See text and note 105 supra, p. -. The Board
has studied the matter of amending Part 207 to include language comparable to that in other
sections but it has not yet acted.
98 1959 CAB Ann. Rep. 30.
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scheduled transatlantic airlines are also members of IATA and come under
its sanctions, as foreign carriers do.
Restrictions for U.S. carriers are not very detailed." Charter definitions
are quite similar to those in Part 212 of the Economic Regulations, but
part 207 has not been limited by policy statements. Consequently the
standards for scheduled United States airlines appear to be more liberal
than for other classes of carriers. However, IATA 045 binds the U.S.
transatlantic lines and makes the rules substantially equal.
2. On-Route Charters.
Under the present rules no prior permission is needed for the airlines
to conduct on-route charter flights, nor is there any limit to the number
that may be flown."' Charterers must, however, file the IATA application.
3. Off-Route Charters.
When a scheduled U.S. carrier wants to conduct a charter flight on
other than its regular route prior permission must be obtained. If the
other airlines which fly the proposed route consent to the trip, giving
notice of this fact to the Board is the only action needed. If permission is
not obtained from the other route carriers then there must be a finding
of public interest by the Board before the flight is allowed.' The standards
which the Board uses to find if the grant is in the public interest do not
appear in the regulation nor have they been articulated elsewhere. A pro-
cedural rule has been promulgated by the Board for these situations.! The
carrier must set forth the pertinent details concerning the flight and serve
other route-carriers. Objecting carriers have five days to file objections
and ten days more to give supporting reasons as to why the proposed
flight would not be in the public interest, demonstrating, for example,
that they are willing and able to conduct the flight themselves. It is
paradoxical that even though supplemental and cargo carriers are no
longer subject to route carriers' first refusal rights, off-route scheduled
carriers must still follow the above procedure. As a practical matter, how-
ever, there are few occasions when it is used.
Part 207 of the Economic Regulations prevents a carrier from per-
forming off-route charters during "any calendar quarter . . .which in
the aggregate, on a revenue plane-mile basis, exceeds 22 per cent of the
revenue plane miles flown by it in scheduled air transportation during
the preceding twelve month period." Since the scheduled lines fly extensive
scheduled operations this provision has never had any effect on the airlines'
capacity to conduct off-route charter flights."
C. United States Supplemental And Cargo Carriers
1. Statutory Problems.
Regulation of supplemental and cargo carriers, i.e., "Part 295 Carriers,"
has been left almost exclusively in the hands of the CAB. Since IATA is
an organization of scheduled airlines very few of the carriers in this
category are members. Seaboard & Western, a scheduled cargo carrier, is
" CAB Econ. Regs. § 207.8. An outline of Part 207 is presented in the text at pp. - supra.
100 14 C.F.R. § 207.5 (1951).
114 C.F.R. § 207.8(b).
2 14 C.F.R. § 302.600.
a 14 C.F.R. § 302.601 (a).
" Foreign Off-Route Charter Service Investigation, Order No. E-12945, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 18.
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a member of IATA but no longer has voting privileges when it comes
to passenger matters.' The Flying Tiger Line has the status of associate
member and does not have voting privileges.! The only relevant regula-
tion for this class of carriers is the Board's Part 295.7
Until April 28, 1961 Part 295 provided for granting single flight
exemptions under section 416(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. Although
compliance with the provisions of Part 295 virtually assured an exemption,
the regulation stated that "each application will be considered and passed
upon by the Board in accordance with the statutory standards of . . . the
Act."' In American Airlines v. CAB9 the court decided that for the
Board to grant an exemption under the statute, it must make factual
findings so that the court might judge their validity, not findings made
in terms of statutory conclusions. In theory each set of facts was to be
passed on separately.
The basic premise of the Act comes from section 401 (a) which states
that a carrier cannot engage in air transportation unless it has received
a certificate from the Board authorizing that transportation. In order to
provide an exemption from this section the Board must show that there
is an undue burden placed on the carrier either because of the limited ex-
tent or the unusual circumstances of the proposed operations. It must also
show that it is in the public interest that exemption rather than certifi-
cation be used in that particular case. The court in American Airlines read
in the further qualification that the exemption process could not be used
to impinge upon the system of certificated airlines.
When individual exemptions were granted for charter flights it was
easy to bring the facts under the requirements of the statute. Since most
charter arrangements involve contracts for one round trip flight, it would
have been too time consuming and too expensive to conduct a certifica-
tion proceedings each time a contract was made. The Board stated that
the fact that these contracts were made during a short period each year
before the summer season was an unusual circumstance, not typical of air
transportation in general. On this basis it concluded that use of the
exemption procedure was valid, citing the "the undue burden" on the
carrier because of both the "limited extent" and the "unusual circum-
stances" concerning the charter operation." Some exemption orders refer
to the public interest aspects of the particular chartering group." This
happened most when the order involved waiver of one of the provisions of
Part 295. However, most decisions did not make a special public interest
finding for the group concerned but relied on the fact that it had been
the Board's experience over the years that supplementing the charter
capacity of the scheduled airlines with other carriers was "necessary and
desirable in the public interest."1
In April 1961 the Board began to grant blanket 180 day exemptions
'N.Y. Times, March 19, 1961, § 10, p. 5, col. 1, 3.
a IATA, World Air Transport Statistics 3 (1960).
7 ER-305, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
' Section 295.1.
9235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
'°ER-305, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
" See, e.g., Capitol Airways, Order No. E-15456, June 28, 1960. (Experiment in International
Living); Flying Tiger Line, Order No. E-15256, May 30, 1960. (Mich. & Ann Arbor-Washteraw
Council of Churches).
12 ER-305, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
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under section 416(b) of the Act.13 The court limitations on section
416(b) would appear to be more serious when exemptions are not con-
sidered on a flight by flight basis, but are granted for 180 day periods. It
is not so clear that certification is an undue burden in these situations.
4
Another case, however, indicates that the Board can conduct experi-
ments, using the exemption process, as long as certification proceedings
are also under way. It has been held that as long as the exempted carriers
were parties to pending certification proceedings this would be enough
of an unusual circumstance to justify use of exemptions.'" The Board, in
the Transatlantic Charter Investigation, has stated that exemptions will
only be granted to parties actively seeking certification. 6 It was argued
that pending certification proceedings are not an unusual circumstance."
However, the authority of this case would seem to protect these ex-
emptions.
If certificates are eventually issued as a result of the Transatlantic
Charter Investigation it will not be possible to give the carrier blanket
permission to fly between any points which their business may demand.
It has been held that the Act requires that certificates name specific
terminal points." Unless the certificates have detailed lists of authorized
points, a certain amount of flexibility in the charter trade may be sacri-
ficed through certification. It might be possible to continue the exemption
procedure in unusual cases where terminal points are not covered by
charter certificates. Whether one flight charter exemptions will still be
granted if certificates are issued is not entirely clear.
2. Administration.
There have been problems in administering the Board's Charter regula-
tions. Starting with the problems precipitated by the vague standards
announced in 1949 the Board has been plagued by the problem of en-
forcing the rules concerning charter eligibility. In the early days of the
policy the rules were of a general nature, leaving the Board to make
individual judgments. After 1955 the Board made standards more precise.
This has aided administration as the volume of charter traffic has increased.
Most of the exemption decisions have been delegated to the Board's staff.
There are many devices that the Board has used to solve its administrative
problems.
a. Advisory Procedures.--Chartering groups may seek advisory opin-
ions from the Bureau of Economic Regulation so that eligibility can be
determined at an early stage." Detailed representations can help to estab-
lish the group's status in reliable fashion before travel plans have proceeded
very far. Carriers must inform groups making reservations that the ad-
visory procedure is available." Advisory opinions helped to cut down the
number of formal denial orders under the individual exemption pro-
cedure." Because carriers have submitted applications which the Board
"Revision 26, Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
" Id., (Dissenting opinion).
"American Airlines v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
'7 Id., (concurring and dissenting opinions).
"United Airlines v. CAB, 278 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
1CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.60.
"CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.12.
" The Board has held that advisory opinions are not illegal ex parle communications. Flying
Tiger Line, Order No. E-15520, July 8, 1960, p. 2, n. 1; Brief TWA, Docket 11460.
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rejected under the individual system, the Board does not believe that the
carriers would necessarily have performed such charters on their own
responsibility. Since there is no present pre-flight filing requirement, the
Board expects that carriers, for their own protection, will ask for ad-
visory opinions in doubtful cases."
b. Adversary Proceedings.-During peak seasons prior to April 1961
as many as seven CAB staff members were employed in processing charter
applications.23 Their task was aided by the fact that the scheduled route
carriers sometimes submitted briefs pointing out Part 295 violations.24
Detailed application forms had to be served on these competing carriers.2"
With seasonal exemptions the Board no longer has formal surveillance
by the route carriers as an aid to enforcement. When it adopted the
present system it rejected a proposal that charter data be filed prior to
each flight and that it be open to public scrutiny. The Board stated that
substantial violations would be readily known to competing carriers and
appropriate complaints could be made. "
c. The Board's Decisions.-Under the single exemption rules the Board
was not always rigid in interpretation of Part 295. The principles articu-
lated in exemption cases continue to be applied as standards for advisory
opinions and granting of waivers. An examination of the exemption
orders issued over a period of several years indicates a strict but not in-
flexible application of the regulations. The most. common provision waived
was the sixty-day filing requirement," now abolished. Even if no real
excuse were given, late filing did not stand as a bar if there were no other
defects in the application.
The Board tends to excuse charters which go beyond the normally al-
lowable scope of solicitation" if there is some intermediate screening pro-
cess which limits the potential size of the group and if the Board feels
that the group has public interest aspects. An exemption was granted for
American Youth Hostels, although easy to join and drawing from a nation-
wide membership, because the trip included "a degree of rigorous travel
on foot or bicycle with low cost hostel accommodations which severely
limits appeal to the traveling public."' Another group, solicited gen-
erally from students of several states was approved because "the program
was purposeful, educational . . .not designed to promote cheap air trans-
portation or attract the itinerant traveler."'" A group of foreign students
coming to live with American families was approved because "the number
of participants is severely limited by finding host families," there was a
screening process, and outsiders had donated funds.9 Another group con-
sisting of Boy Scouts drawn from a number of different European coun-
tries, was potentially very large. However, the Board reasoned that there
"'CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
2 3Letter from CAB to author, March 7, 1961.
"
4 Flying Tiger Line, Docket No. 11460, Order No. E-15520, July 8, 1960. (English working
girls seeking American jobs held not bona fide group.)
25 CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.13, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
29 CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
" CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295.3.
"SCAB Econ. Regs. § 295.13, 25 Fed. Reg. 5322 (1960).
2 CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.30. The limit for non-local groups, now 20,000, has increased
over the years.
a"Order No. E-15260, May 23, 1960.
3'Order No. E-15240, May 17, 1960 (Int'l Center, Univ. of Louisville).
a2 Order No. E-15456, June 28, 1960 (Experiment in Int'l Living).
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was some selection process involved so that this group might be described
as set off from the general public. There was also the very practical reason
of not wanting to strand the group in the United States."3
Judging the appropriate unit which may form an entity for charter
purposes leads to fine questions of fact. The United Nations Flying Club
case mentioned earlier represents a liberal approach.34 One decision allowed
Brown University and the Rhode Island School of Design to charter one
airplane, citing the common ties that the schools had such as joint library
privileges, common extra-curricular activities, and exchange of students
for some courses."' A less liberal decision allowed members of the N.Y.
State Medical School to charter an airplane but excluded members of its
affiliated hospitals."
Where a provision affects the status of only one or two members of
the charter group the Board tends to be quite strict about waiving pro-
visions. In a rare case the daughter of a professor was allowed to travel on
a university charter even though her father did not participate in the
group. The Board explained that it was planning to change the rule gov-
erning these situations anyway.' In most cases, however, members must
come precisely within the definitions found in the regulations or permis-
sion will not be granted. 8
Since there is always an incentive for private parties to organize charters
for profit, the Board has strictly limited organization expenses. If the
listed expenses exceed the permitted dollar amounts," the Board will usually
grant the exemption subject to the condition that the expenses charged
be lowered."' If expenses are much higher than those permitted this can
be grounds for flat denial, especially if the organization has consistently high
expenses on repeated trips.4'
Under the regulations persons are presumed not to be bona fide mem-
bers of the chartering organization if they have not been members for
six months before the flight date.' This presumption can be rebutted. At
the same time the decisions show that the six-month rule does not provide
a shield ' of safety if reasons for joining the organization are suspect. The
Board has said that technical compliance with the six months rule will
not remove a "presumption of public solicitation."'" If there is an abnormal
increase in the club's membership during the years in which it begins to
sponsor charter flights and if the organization has nominal entrance re-
quirements, the Board may conclude that there has been public solicita-
tion even if all the members come with the six months rule." This could
33 Order No. E-15630, Aug. 8, 1960 (Belgian Inter-Federal Boy Scouts).
"4 See text infra p. -.
3" Order No. E-1 5348, June 8, 1960.
"Order No. E-15305.
reOrder No. E-15348, June 8, 1960. The present rules permit participation of the immediate
families of bona fide members even if the members do not travel with the group. CAB Econ. Regs.
5 295.32.
"Order No. E-15348, June 8, 1960 (brother of member not allowed); Order No. E-15255
(Univ. of Chicago, close relatives banned).
"Permitted expenses are $300-500 per round trip, depending on group size. CAB Econ. Regs.
5 295.33.
41 See, e.g., Order No. E-15207 (Polish Friendly Society).
4 Order No. E-15309, June 1, 1960 (Yorkville Gesellkeits Klub).
" CAB Econ. Regs. S 295.2 (j).
43Order No. E-15309, June 1, 1960; Order No. E-15354, June 9, 1960 (dictum) (Catholic
Kolping Society).
"Order No. E-15309, June 1, 1960.
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get the Board into highly subjective questions of individual sincerity but
not if used only in more extreme cases where other violations are also
found.
The Board has steadfastly maintained that allowing mingling of plane-
load groups would break down the charter concept which requires "the
participant to subordinate his own personal wishes to the wishes of the
charter group as a whole."4 Consequently the Board has been quite strict
in its prohibitions against permitting return trip mingling. The rule also
states that only five per cent of the passengers may travel one-way if a
round trip flight is chartered." A Yale University exemption was granted
only on the condition that this five per cent limit be maintained, especially
when it was shown that one-way passengers had been solicited.47 On the
other hand a group from Harvard managed to get the mingling provision
waived although it appeared at first that exemption would be denied. In
the Harvard case students were offered a choice of any one of eleven
flights in both westbound and eastbound directions. At the time that the
trips were planned, IATA carriers on their own routes were not bound
by the "no mingling" rule. The flights were planned with IATA carriers.
Later it became necessary to employ an American carrier and seek exemp-
tion under Part 295. The Board first issued an opinion flatly denying
exemption, because of the mingling involved, and said that the group
proceeded at its own risk in assuming none of its flights would have to be
carried under Part 295." The IATA carriers proceeded with their con-
tracts despite the fact that the Board had conditioned IATA 045 to pre-
vent mingling. Twelve days later, the group again attempted to obtain
the exemption, this time using a different carrier, albeit one also subject to
Part 295. The Board considered this as an appeal of the same case even
though it was being brought by a different carrier. The new carrier was
granted the exemption. The Board stated that it did not find that the
violations as to mingling had been corrected. However, four flights had
already departed for Europe where the addresses of the passengers were
unknown. Denial of the exemption would result in stranding the pas-
sengers in Europe and cause "substantial hardship" to those involved.
Therefore, three days before the flight date the Board reversed itself and
allowed the second carrier to conduct the flights as requested. 9
The case shows that where hardship may result the Board will not
necessarily be inflexible in its administration. At the same time the Board
was put in a position where it had to issue two contrasting opinions on
the same facts within a very short period of time.
d. Post-flight Sanctions.-The season exemptions have largely eliminated
the pre-flight screening devices described above. One Board member has
viewed this development as a failure to provide a "prompt and adequate
remedy.""0 However, there are a number of sanctions left to the Board
which can be used after the flight has taken place both to prevent re-
currence of violations and to punish violators.
" BOAC, Order No. E-15301, May 31, 1960. (British Legal Professions.) This case was
decided under Part 212, but the principle is the same.
4CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.14(c); Agreement Adopted by Traffic Conference of JATA, Order
No. E-15047, March 28, 1960, p. 2.
47 Order No. E-15238.
4 Seaboard & Western Airlines, Order No. E-15364, June 10, 1960.
"'Flying Tiger Line, Order No. E-15496, June 22, 1960.
'°CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
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As an aid to enforcement the carrier must file monthly statements
giving basic information on every charter flight." In addition very de-
tailed data certified by the charterer, travel agent and carrier as to each
charter operation must be retained by the carrier for two years, available
for Board inspection."
The Bureal of Enforcement conducts investigations of charter cases.
The Bureau has no members whose only duty is to patrol the charter
field, but it will act on complaints made by private parties. Cases are
sometimes referred to the Bureau from the Bureau of Economic Regula-
tion which processes applications under the various charter provisions.
Investigation is usually done by correspondence with the charterer and the
air carrier involved since the Bureau's staff is not large enough to conduct
field investigations in each case. However, under some circumstances a
Special Agent will be sent to the scene."
The carriers have an important stake in maintaining clean records.
When it inaugurated seasonal exemptions the Board stated that the self-
interest of the Part 295 carriers in remaining eligible for exemptions and
eventual certification constitutes a strong incentive for them to conform
to the regulations. The seasonal exemptions could be revoked at any time.
A new exemption is necessary for each season. 4 In recent years the com-
pliance records of the carriers themselves have ceased to be the issue that
they once were."
Violations by chartering groups constitute another problem. Under
the single exemption policy the Board considered records as part of the
public interest test.' Since many organizations make charter flights an
annual event this gave the groups reason for care. However, the Board
no longer rules on individual groups and has lost this sanction.
Although the Board has the power to bring formal enforcement pro-
ceedings, " there has been only one such proceeding under the charter
regulations." This case reached the formal order stage because the com-
plainant, a travel agent, had filed a motion before the Board asking for
institution of proceedings. No adverse finding was made.'
Various perjury and false statement statutes provide an additional
enforcement weapon. Charter statements must be sworn to by officials of
the charterer, the travel agent and the carrier. The texts of the various
penal statutes are printed conspicuously on the forms provided."' Criminal
reference is awkward in practice."' However, the presence of the statutes
on charter forms probably has a helpful in terrorem effect.
"CAB Econ. Regs. § 295.6.
" CAB Econ Regs. pt. 249.
5 Letter from CAB to the author, March 7, 1961; Some travel agents have been described as
"vigilante groups" who have acted to inform the CAB of violations. Friedlander, Hope for the
Traveler, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1961, § 2, p. 1, 20, col. 3.
"4CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
"Compare Regulation Policy Statement No. 2, 22 Fed. 2241 (1957), with Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 25 Fed. Reg. 10944 (1960).
"6Order No. E-15256, May 20, 1960. (Mich. & Ann Arbor-Washtenaw Council of Churches)
(exemption granted but greater burden of proof imposed); Order No. E-15309, June 1, 1960
(Yorkville Gesellkeits Klub).
57 14 C.F.R. 302.200; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1001-09.
"Letter from CAB to author, March 7, 1961.
"University Travel Co. v. Flying Tiger Line, Order No. E-12990, Sept. 18, 1958.
618 U.S.C. § 1621; 49 U.S.C. § 1472.
61 Until April 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was used on forms. The Bureau of Enforcement referred
three cases to the Justice Department under this section. Two were not prosecuted because of
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IV. CHARTER FLIGHTS; THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Much criticism has been directed against the charter rules. Representa-
tive Celler, Chairman of the House Anti-trust Subcommittee has called
them "arbitrary and illogical." The president of the supplemental carrier
trade group has pleaded for "a more sensible definition" of what consti-
tutes a charter, saying that the "magical and metaphysical affinity" of
the group must be examined with a mental microscope."" A New York
Times writer has described the standards as "senseless, outside the realm
of bureaucratic thinking."" In order to evaluate these comments it is neces-
sary to examine briefly the "realm of thinking" inside which these rules
have been made.
Since the Second World War the CAB has been committed to a
policy of letting the initiative for setting transatlantic fares lie with
IATA." IATA members fix uniform fares. The requirement of a unani-
mous vote makes it possible for the least efficient of the airlines to influence
the IATA rate." It has been admitted that at IATA conferences American
carriers generally have taken the initiative in proposing reductions while
foreign lines have resisted these changes."
In this context the present dual system of pricing has evolved. Charter
passengers pay about $260 for a round trip from New York to Lon-
don while others pay $486 and up." The CAB has called attention
to the seasonal nature of the charter business. It has said that if the
public had access to charters on a less restricted basis the scheduled
carriers would not have the opportunity to accumulate profits during the
summer in order to provide for the off-season. It has defended the rules by
saying that the restrictive charter concept began with IATA and was later
adopted and approved by the United States and other governments." This
seems like another way of saying that the CAB has been committed to
supporting the IATA rate structure.
If the charter regulations seem to discriminate against part of the public
it is because they are meant to. If the rules are dedicated to limiting charter
traffic to a "safe amount," then it does not matter exactly what rules are
used. Someone will always be ineligible for the lower fares. It is worth
noting, however, that in Europe IATA regulations permit solicitation of
individuals for charter flights if the flight is part of an inclusive tour at
least as expensive as what normal airplane fare would be."0 This has pro-
duced a competitive, but workable result.'
Of course the Board deserves credit for the 1955 Transatlantic Charter
Policy and its successors which have made it possible for supplemental car-
riers to compete on the North Atlantic route. Along with Icelandic Air-
the strong showing that the courts have required. A third was under study. Letter from CAB
to author, March 7, 1961.
"Letter from Rep. Celler, (D., N.Y.) to the N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1959, 5 2, p. 18, col. S.
"Clayton Burwell, Lecture on Supplemental Air Carrier Service, American Univ. School of
Bus. Administration, Nov. 11, 1960, p. 29 (mim.).
64N.Y. Times, July 5, 1959, § 2, p. 15, col. 1.
65 See generally, "Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries," Hearings Before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, H. of R., 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1023.
6" Id. at 1054.
8
7 Id. at 1038.
66 The current IATA round trip fare from New York to London is $900 first class.
69Letter from CAB to N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1959, 5 2, p. 21, col. 2.
70 IATA Charter Resolution 045 (8).
"' Brice, Holidays by Air, Aeronautics, May 1960, p. 21.
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lines, a scheduled airline which does not belong to IATA, they have pro-
vided a yardstick for transatlantic fares. If it were not for their presence
IATA probably would have set uniform charter rates above what are now
being charged." The Board has refused to include a rate floor in Part
295."' The IATA carriers justify their own dual pricing system by main-
taining that great savings are made when the airlines deal on a charter
basis. The airline is guaranteed a flat rate for the plane and does not have
to risk taking off with empty seats. It also claims to save money in sales
effort and bookkeeping by dealing only with the chartering organization
and not with individual passengers. It is doubtful, however, that the book-
keeping and sales savings are so great as to justify such a large price
differential. The airlines maintain large permanent organizations for this
purpose anyhow.' During the peak season, when most charters are
carried, the load factor on transatlantic flights runs above ninety per cent
in economy class s so that the full plane argument is not too compelling.
With the new group rates it seems even less persuasive. It is significant
that transatlantic fares have always been disproportionately higher than
transcontinental fares even though distances are approximately equal and
the same equipment is used on both routes. 6 The recently approved pro-
posal to give a 38 per cent discount to groups of twenty-five only points
up the issue of whether the basic fare structure serves the public interest.7
Would it be in the public interest simply to allow the charter business
to continue to grow along the lines that it is following now? Under the
present rules there are a number of reasons why more charter flights will
not necessarily lead to the sound development of transatlantic air trans-
portation. Lack of flexibility is the main disadvantage in charter travel.
The passenger must travel on the dates that his group selects. If the group
has chartered a round trip then he must travel on both legs of the flight.'
He cannot pick his traveling companions if they do not belong to the
chartering organization. If he must change his plans and return home at
a different date his seat cannot be resold. Arrangements for the flight
must often be made many months in advance. The traveler can never be
sure just how much the flight ultimately will cost. Most charters are run
as cooperative ventures with the charterer's responsibility limited to
making business arrangements for the flight. Therefore, even after the
flight is over, extra charges may be made if unsuspected expenses have
occurred." Instead of dealing with an airline or professional travel agent
the charter is often organized by inexperienced amateurs. There is always
the chance that at the last minute the flight may be found not to conform
to the appropriate regulations and may never take off at all. Equipment
used is usually not the most modern available but has been taken off
72 Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra note 65, at 1080, para. 65.
"
5CAB Econ. Regs. pt. 295, Revision, 26 Fed. Reg. 3628 (1961).
7 N.Y. Times, July 5, 1959, § 2, p. 15, col. 1.
" IATA World Air Transport Statistics 45 (1960)
76 Present jet fare from New York to Los Angeles is $138.60 plus 10% tax; from New York
to London, $270. In 1959 the transatlantic rate was 150% more than transcontinental rate. For
an interesting comment on this subject see Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee, supra
note 65, at 1054. A defense is found in IATA, World Air Transport Background; "The Cost of
Flying" (mim.) (1959).
77Order No. E-18075, March 5, 1962.
"SCAB Econ. Regs. 5 295.14(c).
7" See, e.g., Harvard Student Agencies, "Cooperative Air Charter for Members," (mim. form)
(1961); Letter from Harvard Student Agencies to flight members (Sept. 1960).
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regular runs. Jet aircraft are usually too large for most organizations
to fill.
Under the Federal Aviation Act the CAB does not have the power to
fix international rates. It can only alter them if they are "unjustly dis-
criminatory or unduly preferential.""0 However, because of its privilege
of disapproving agreements and removing anti-trust immunity from the
carriers concerned, the CAB holds a powerful weapon over IATA.1 By
passing on individual rate resolutions it has the power to influence the
level of international fares. It could even remove its support from the
present price structure altogether by not approving IATA's price fixing
machinery."2 This may involve the United States carriers in problems of
negotiating satisfactory agreements with other countries." However, there
are ways to deal with the fare issue.
V. CONCLUSION
By examining the growth of the Transatlantic charter market it is
possible to see that the present situation has stemmed from a desire to
provide sufficient air transportation without directly facing the problem
of the prevailing IATA fare structure. If the charter business continues
to grow in its present form it will not provide the convenient form of
inexpensive air travel needed by the public at large. Although there may
always be some legitimate demand for charter group travel, the present
market is an artificial one created by technical restrictions. The current
Transatlantic Charter Investigation" may develop ideas that will help
the present process work more smoothly. However, until the rate structure
is dealt with as a whole there will always be a problem of discrimination if
the majority of the public is unable to take advantage of cheaper fares,
and the problem of administration will follow as these people attempt to
become part of the favored minority.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 1002(f).
,' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 412, 414.
8 See letter from Emanuel Celler to N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1962, § 10, p. 1, col. 4.
13 Cohen, A Case History in International Air Fares and Rates Negotiation, 27 J. Air Law &
Com. 150 (1960).
"Docket No. 11908.
